



Nuclear efforts of Iran under the shadow of US sanctions



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Abstract

Iran has started the Atom program for Peace which has already planned by the US for countries concerned in consuming atomic energy for non-violent devotions. Iran also decided to develop a nuclear program to generate electricity. In 1979 US and the west has temporary banned the project. The United States has applied these sanctions on Iran for various purposes. This includes weakening domestic support for the Islamic regime and, recently, imposing charges on Iran to continue its nuclear program. These sanctions have left Iran with local and foreign capital, and have isolated it economically and politically. However, the regime has survived and continues to challenge the international community. Iran has also made great strides in nuclear planning. This article aims to explain how the Iranian's survived despite international sanctions specially the US. It rebuilds the interaction between the contraction of sanctions by the UN Security Council, the United States and targeted regime strategies to promote the nuclear program and maintain cohesion within the choice.

Key Words: Iran, Nuclear efforts, US Sanctions, isolated, UN Security Council.

Introduction

Iran is a typical geopolitically sensitive region of potential average power in a stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. The region has been of particular interest to major international players for more than two centuries and is therefore very sensitive to changes in the nature of the international political system. As a country crossing two forms of water, Iran's political fate, foreign policy decisions and freedom of independence have been strongly influenced by westerns and US. In the new configuration of the system, Iran as a state with a common border of 1,500 miles from the Soviet Union has gained even greater geopolitical importance. Consequently, ability to use military force as a policy tool against countries in the vicinity of one another was severely restrained. "They also often refrained from putting undue pressures on such countries, lest they turn to the competitor".[Marschall, 2003](#).

The Iranian belief that the Persian Gulf is a Persian lake, which means Iran is the main coastal power, stems from the time of Ahmdinejad hegemony over the Middle East. In the third century AD, according to the Iranian historic memory, the Sassanid king Ardeshir restored the Persian Gulf and its shores, which in the meantime had been raided by Arab tribes, to Iranian sovereignty. He also sent an army into Bahrain and left his son Shahpur I as replacement. The Portuguese entered the Persian Gulf in 1507 and occupied many Persian islands and cities. Under Shah Abbas (1587–1629), the Portuguese were expelled and Bahrain, Bandar Abbas, Qishm and Hormuz restored to Persian sovereignty. Shah Abbas' successors were unable to hold Persian power over the region. Bahrain and several Iranian islands were seized by the ruler of Oman. It was only under Nader

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Shah in 1736–1737, that Iran re-established control over Bahrain and the entire coast from Basra to Makran. Nader Shah designed the first Iranian navy. The plan, however, was abandoned when he was assassinated in 1747. Iran's power yet again lessened, when British dominance in the Persian Gulf rose. In 1783, Iran lost Bahrain to the Utubi Arabs who occupied the island.

In 1865, Nasser ud-Din Shah attempted to establish a navy. This was foiled by the British. Reza Shah reasserted Iran's control over the Persian Gulf in the 1920s. He unsuccessfully protested against British sovereignty over Bahrain on historic grounds and challenged the Iraqi position over the Shatt al-Arab. He brought the oil-rich province of Khuzistan under the authority of the central government in Tehran, when the Arab chief Khaz_al instigated a rebellion. The sheikh had ruled the province in near autonomy, despite the fact that, in 1847, the Ottomans had recognized Iranian sovereignty over Abadan, Muhammarah (Khorramshahr) and the Eastern banks of the Shatt al-Arab. In the mid-1930s, Reza Shah, without success, laid claim over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands. These had been part of Persian territory in the nineteenth century, but were brought under British control in 1903 by hoisting Sharjah's flag on them.¹¹ The Tunbs were later given to Ras al-Khaimah when it split off from Sharjah. Reza Shah also attempted to build up a navy, but this attempt came to an end with his forced abdication in 1941, when British and Russian forces occupied Iran.¹² His son, Muhammad Reza Shah, needed the next twenty years to consolidate his power domestically before he could turn his attention to the Persian Gulf.

History of Iran's Nuclear Innovation

“The history of Iran's nuclear innovation dates back to the mid-1950s. In 1957, Iran accepted an agreement with the United States and took part in a nuclear funeral inspection. Iran set up an early nuclear research center at Tehran University and purchased a small research reactor. Iran was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NPT).Iran did not start discussing the need to build nuclear power plants that would provide electricity” and reduce oil and gas for purposes and tariffs in the mid-seventies. ([Begum&Bakht, 2018](#)).

Iran is currently dependent on other countries for the supply of fuel for nuclear project. He is concerned about the reintroduction of sanctions and their implications for his access to fuel, which he will need in the upcoming. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited the Iranian Arak heavy-duty water device, confirmed that the materials were not redirected, and stated that Iran was relatively honest in its nuclear activities.

The 1979 Islamic revolution and the resulting hostage crisis sparked mistrust in the United States towards Iran. After the Iranian opinion on that topic, the role of the United States in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1989 aggravated the problem. In general, diplomatic relations between nations since the 1990s have been characterized by the reluctance of both sides to become more constructive. Unfortunately, the other party appears to have been illegal when the US or Iran opened it to improve relationship. The positive thing about this premature situation could improve.

Relations between nations were provoked by three main contradictions. Firstly, the United States has blamed Iran of supporting terrorism. Given the United States War on Terrorism (GWOT), this claim is clearly problematic. In particular, the United States accuses Iran of helping Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda. Iran was first identified as a terrorist lawyer in 1984 and was included on this list.

Iran's relations with Europe have, for the most part, remained stable, although they have been temporarily tense, with rapid development under the pragmatic Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami since 1990. However, the rise of Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran's uncompromising stance on nuclear activities, and ruthless comments on issues such as the Holocaust had seriously affected the relative stability of the relationship. As the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the United States did not improve, Iran called on European countries to defend their economic and political interests. “Iran plays an important regional role, and Europe needs assistance to secure profits not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the wider region of Iran. Looking east, for example, the risk of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe via Iran is particularly important for EU

member states and provides an important opportunity for cooperation. Iran pays heavily in the fight against drug trafficking, killing hundreds of police officers each year”[\(Iathol, Qazafi, & Husain, 2017\)](#).

Theoretical Approach

Realist, neorealist, or Constructivists can fully explain the behavior of the state, not the subtleties of foreign policy. Realistic theories that emphasize the pursuit of power as the main motive of state action do not adequately consider ideal and institutional factors such as the role of identity in determining state action and the interests of key persons. However, even if one accepts the realistic view that power is ultimately the main driver of state action, how state acquires power and how it uses power acquired by state it is largely determined by that tendency and the ideal one. The views and interests of key stakeholders also influence the perception and evaluation of external developments and their impact on the interests of a particular state.

Constructivists, on the other hand, emphasize the role of ideas, and the identity and interests of conscious actors who they believe are common ideas, in determining the behavior of the state. However, the overemphasis on the ideal dynamics behind government behavior by constructivists ignores the fact that ideas are often used for purposes determined by performance calculations. In short, both theories ignore the close relationship between power and the dynamics of ideas in state behavior. A brief theoretical discussion is required to understand the difficulties in assessing Iran's expansion decision. The nuclear order created by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the signing of the Cold War, was supported by theories of realism and neorealism in international relations. Realistic and nonrealistic scientists have assumed that the revolutionary international environment has provoked players to look for ways to strengthen their power over other players.

The intellectual architect of neorealism claims that the IR is chaotic, in the sense that there are no entities on which the system runs. National actors are wary of other actors, very cautious, and strive to be strong independent of all external constraints. As nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of security, as is the gold standard of deterrence, the acquisition of weapons is considered a rational response to the existing difficulties of the anarchist world. Moreover, ethical concerns may have little impact on this concept of the international dog eating and dog eating system. As Walt says, "anarchy is an area where everyone can play a lot of dirty billiards." Strategic interdependence and lack of morality make every state "dull to take effect. It means that the player must be willing to act according to the rules set by the player. (Art and Waltz, 1983)(Art and Waltz, 1983).

Relations are determined mechanically, while a unipolar structure does not have restrictions or limits them, but does not require united alliances, which gives the superpower freedom of action. It is vulnerable to states that are strongly attached to ideology. At the same time, in most countries, the subsystems that interact with members of the region have returned. The nation pays more attention to the interests of the region, because security is closely related. Geographical proximity has a greater impact on the dynamics of security of neighbors than between distant states. (Walt, 2009). Both of the states have diverse risk sensitivities, but both have a same converge of their interests and especially Iran is currently dependent on other countries for the supply of fuel for its atomic power system. She is concerned about the reintroduction of sanctions and their implications for his access to fuel, which she will need in the future and the International Atomic Energy Agency reserved about the Iranian Arak heavy water reactor. IAEA had confirmed that the materials and stated that Iran was relatively honest in its nuclear activities.

Iran's Islamic Political System

The nature of Iran's political system has changed Islamic Revolution changed but not its political culture. Thus, radical characters and their particular challenges, hostilities, and supremacy determinations have extremely affected Iran's relationship with other countries in the world because rival traits have recycled vital foreign policy interrelated matters in their influence and struggles. In the 1990s they unsatisfied practical module's efforts to stabilize Iran's relations with

the Western countries. Irrespective of Khomeini's real intentions, Iran's constitution, existing organizations, and their authorities require an assembled inconsistency, but the balance is in Islam's favor. (Hunter, 2010). Related to the national program, "his foreign policy platform was limited, consisting of lofty slogans about national dignity and the need to protect the national interest against foreigners". (Rezaei, 2017)

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini started the revolution with the support of Iranian people against the shah because they were prevailed frustration with his government. The money that was earned by the Iranian oil, Shah was spending on American military products and very little amount to be ploughed back into economy of Iran. A large community of Shia clerics also against the shah because of his westernizes reforms and dropping the Islamic ways of life. In this situation shah faced collapsing country, the fall of Shah's regime in Iran happened by the struggle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to keep Iran an Islamic nation. (Amuzegar, 1991)

Khomeini's Ideas and Iran' Foreign Policy

Khomeini point of view that Muslims are a single community (ummah), and the borders and boundaries among them are an artificial and are just created by foreign enemies of Islam. Khomeini opposed nationalism because he broke with the Muslim world, and thought that the interests and magnificence of Islam should govern the policies of Muslim states, and not limit countrywide benefits. He attributed the behavior of Muslim countries to the fact that they are not committed to true Islam and respect what he called Americans. He encouraged close collaboration among Muslims, saying that "no one can defeat one billion Muslims if they were united. Many damaging aspects of Iran's foreign policy can be explained by the lack of adequate focus on national interests, a legacy of Khomeini's thinking. (Mohammadally, 1979).

However, the legacy of Khomeini's worldview lingers, along with the ideological and idealistic tendencies of the early revolutionary period. Early revolutionary tendencies remain strong among influential circles, including the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, and, after being eclipsed during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, they made a comeback during the first term of Ahmadinejad's presidency (2004 –2009). All elements within the regime were influenced by these factors, albeit to varying degrees, a difference which colored their approach to foreign policy. Broadly speaking, those whose ideas were closer to traditional interpretations of Islam and were somewhat more influenced by nationalist tendencies, favored a less revolutionary and more pragmatic foreign policy, which served Iran's national interests. They were less viscerally anti-Western and interested in normal relations with the West. Leftists mean-while, were anti-West and more interested in advancing Iran's revolutionary goals. In the last two decades, the leftists have gradually become reformist and advocate a more pragmatic and less revolutionary foreign policy geared to Iran's national interests. More generally, the experiences of the Islamic regime, especially its foreign policy setbacks and its poor performance record, coupled with systemic changes triggered by the Soviet collapse, have greatly diminished the appeal of revolutionary, unrealistic, and ideological foreign policy, without ending the debate on the relative roles that realism and idealism should play in determining Iran's external behavior. (Hunter, 2010)

Khomeini's worldview was polarized, and he saw all things in terms of a battle between truth and righteousness and falsehood between the arrogant powers and the downtrodden nations. He also saw Iran as the standard bearer for and champion of all deprived nations and not only Muslims. This was so because, according to him, Iran's Islamic system was the only one based on true Islam. Khomeini's simplistic and polarized worldview and his antinationalist and pan-Islamist tendencies have had disastrous consequences for Iran. By the mid-1980s, a number of developments, including the growing strength of Iranian nationalism, the Iran-Iraq War, the lack of positive Muslim response to Iran's pan-Islamist policies and the continued centrality of nation-states within the international system had led to the emergence of a more pragmatic worldview, at least on the part of some elements within Iran, and a reduction of antinationalist and pan-Islamist tendencies. (Zabih, 1982).

US-Iran Relations from Mid 50s

In the midst of a chaotic international system, the U.S.-Iran relationship has become increasingly confrontational. The deterioration of relations is not a startling new phenomenon, but rather the culmination of decades of perceived betrayals, open challenges and mutual distrust. Many events and activities have influenced this decline. The historical context of U.S.-Iran relations has set the stage for distrust between the countries and the dismal state of their diplomatic relations. In the aftermath of World War II, Iran turned to the U.S. to help it improve on its economic management and industrialization. With the possible exception of a short period of time during Mohammad Reza Shah's return to power, this was the last time that there has been trust in the relationship.

Extensive U.S.-Iranian relations date back to the early 1950s, although America became involved in Iranian affairs during the Second World War, as part of the Anglo-American and Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941. Despite being of fairly recent origin, U.S.-Iranian relations have been intense, sometimes characterized by friendship and sometimes by hostility. From 1953 to 1978, Iran and America were allies, although their alliance was at times troubled. After the Islamic Revolution, the two countries became bitter enemies and, in the course of 30 years, have suffered from each other's actions and accumulated a long list of grievances, making reconciliation so far difficult. Moreover, in Iran, for some segment of the Islamic regime, enmity with the United States has become a cornerstone of the regime's ideology, worldview, and self-image, a foundation of its legitimacy, and as such inextricably intertwined with intra-regime ideological and power competition. Consequently, for the past 30 years, the Iranian government has not looked at relations with the United States rationally and in light of Iran's national interests. In the United States, too, memories related to the hostage crisis of 1979–1980, the bombing of the U.S. marines in Beirut in 1982, Iran's obstruction of the Middle East peace process, along with the dynamics of American domestic politics and the influence of America's Arab and Israeli allies, have limited the United States' ability to view Iran objectively. Consequently, America has missed opportunities potentially capable of leading to some form of accommodation if not total reconciliation. Post-Soviet systemic developments, and the effects of 9/11, despite some episodes of informal cooperation, as was the case regarding Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion, led to the hardening of the U.S. position toward Iran under presidents Bill Clinton (1993 – 2000) and George W. Bush (2001–2009), with the ultimate goal of changing the Iranian regime. The Bush administration even considered military action to achieve this goal. ([Hunter, 2010](#))

United States' Concerns Over Iran

Since becoming significant, U.S. Iranian relations have been affected by the perennial tensions that exist between global powers and middle powers with regional ambitions. Because generally regional powers tend to act more independently and challenge the supremacy of great powers, the latter are often suspicious of actual and potential regional powers, even in the absence of ideological differences. They only accommodate regional players when they need them in order to confront or contain a rival global power. Despite its economic and military shortcomings, Iran has always had the potential to become a regional power, hence British policy throughout the 19th century to keep Iran weak. The dynamics of the Cold War and later the U.S. need for Iran in the Persian Gulf prompted America to bolster Iran's military capabilities. But even before the end of the Cold War, tensions between Iran and the United States and other Western powers arose when the Shah became too ambitious and began to talk of Iran not only as a Persian Gulf power but also as an Indian Ocean power. The more serious tensions that have characterized Iran-U.S. relations in the post-revolutionary period also partly derive from this perennial tension. The Soviet collapse, by reducing America's need for Iran as a buffer against the USSR, has also enhanced this perennial tension, thus impacting major aspects of U.S. policy toward Iran in the post-Soviet era.

Inevitably the US-Iran relations are connected to the energy interests and security of the global community. Over 20% of world oil supply is carried out daily through the Strait. If the previous uptight relations were to soar between the US and Iran, Iran could strike back by trying to seal or interrupt traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. This, in turn, might end in an armed conflict

between the US and Iran, which certainly will engage the Middle Eastern Region as a Whole". ([Khalid & Safdar, 2016](#))

The agreement specifically addresses the central issue of mistrust between the West and Iran. President Obama believes Iran should show the world that its nuclear program is non-violent and reluctant. Iran has already learned important uranium enrichment techniques, but not more than 20%, but the bomb requires 90% uranium enrichment, but before that Iran violated UN control. But it has not been proven. However, US authorities have found that the measure is reversible in response to Iran's compliance, and sanctions on the oil and banking sector are currently unaffected. ([Geran & Warrick, 2013](#)). In 1999, as part of an overall evaluation of sanctions from US, the US announced plans to allow certain disseminates of nutriment and medication to Iran. The State Department accepted the auction of quantities for the transformation of the invalid Iranian fleet of the Boeing 747 in November., "In March 2000, Albright announced the lifting of the ban on imports of agricultural and craft products". ([Clawson & Rubin, 2005](#)).

The Clinton government opened a top-secret route to Khatami through the Italian representative in 2000, Jean Domenico Pico, who worked at the United Nations. As a "goodwill guarantee", Washington put an end to some of the sanctions imposed by the former government. At the exciting moment of the Khatami Dialogue Initiative, Clinton proposed "a big deal". In conversation for Iran's promise to abandon violence, it recognizes the "Islamic Republic as a regional power" and ends opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. ([Taheri 2006](#)).

Iran Survived Under the Shadow of Threat

However, the leader's warning failed as Washington put new pressure on the SC to penalize Iran. The means of choice is Chapter 7 of Article No. 40, the Charter of the United Nations and is intended for countries classified as a threat to peace or for attacking economic sanctions or military measures. Resolution 1696, unanimously adopted on July 31, 2006, ordered Iran to far-reaching its enrichment on August 31, commencement 30 days. The move banned the transference of atomic technology, missiles, and dual-use, slowed the movement of numerous Iranian administrators, and well-arranged the freezing of properties by 40 companies and individuals, including Bank Sepha and many nuclear weapons projects. He urged countries not to deal with Iran and called for scrutiny of cargo shipped by "Iranian shippers". Resolution warned that non-compliance could lead to diplomatic and economic sanctions. ([Aqanji November 28, 2013](#)).

Ahmadinejad promised that sanctions would not stop Iran from continuing. He even despised the economic threat and said that Iran had survived and successfully applied these sanctions for nearly 30 years. Additional sanctions will help Iran gain autonomy. The emphasis on autonomy was not just a rhetorical speech addressed to a national audience. Ahmadinejad obviously believed that local nuclear technology would advance the country by 50 years. To remind himself of his deep conviction, the leader was influenced that the Iran could reproduce the magnificence of the Persian Kingdom with the help of current knowledge and atomic skill. ([Fars-News-Agency December, 2006](#)).

India- Iran Relations

Iran is strategically important to India because Iran can bring closer to Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries. There was Improving Indo - Iran relationship only watching US thought in 2005 when the Bush government mandatory to change US law permitting India to cooperate on atomic skills. Christine C. Fair said that India and Iran stalemates are generous to US benefits straightly uncertainty they suggest upcoming strategy discrepancy between India and United States. ([Fair, 2007](#)).

The interests of India and Iran met in Central Asia and Afghanistan after the Cold War. Subsequently the drop of the "Taliban regime", Iran and India were crucial to the Taliban uprising in Afghanistan. The two countries supported the US government in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. So, both of states are interested in the stability of the new Afghan regime. India is

the third largest donor in Afghanistan and therefore relies on Iran to support Afghanistan. India not only wants to participate in combined trainings with the Navy of Iran, but also access to the Persian Gulf through its seaport. India believes that the Pakistani army on the western border could be abolished in the war with Pakistan. The Indian government has defended Iran's nuclear enrichment program as a right to civilian research technology. Some Indian companies have also been sanctioned by the United States for supporting Iran's nuclear program ([Twining, January-March 2008](#)).

India sought to maintain a strong relationship with Iran, despite expanding relations with the United States. Most US decision makers feared strengthening India-Iran relations prior to the Indian-American nuclear agreement. The United States was shocked by India's decision to conduct naval exercises with Iran the night before President Bush's visit to India in 2006. ([Fair, 2007](#)).

India and Iran has joint counter-terrorism working group in 2003. India also helped Iran modernize its military equipment. He also helped Iran build batteries from advanced submarines. India conducted a naval exercise with Iran shortly before the US invasion of Iraq. India has also set up new consulates in the Iranian cities of Zahedan and Bandar Abbas. India's strategic relationship with Iran and its presence in border areas could play an important role in future conflicts with Pakistan. Pakistan says the Indian intelligence officer is spoiling a peaceful environment in Baluchistan by accessing it from Iran. The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5 and Germany will allow India to further strengthen its relationship with Iran. Prior to this, India was under constant pressure to balance the growing relationship between Washington and Tehran. Nevertheless, India is very important in the additional US plan to Asia. ([Fair, 2007](#)). In May 2016, Modi visited Iran the dual states contracted a succession of tasks, with the contract of the harbor of Chahbahar and the structure of a railway line from Chahbar to Zahidan. Iran has also improve the bilateral relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan and strategies to utilize the "China Development Initiative One Belt One Road project". (Raghavan, May 26, 2016).

Growing Indo-Iran relations are actual significant for Pakistan, because Pakistan's security strategy is unique to India. The collaboration between the two states India, Iran in Afghanistan and Central Asia is part of the tension between Iran and Pakistan in recently. ([Kutty, June 2014](#)).

Conclusion

Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons should serve its interests, in particular by preventing the use of military force against the government and enhancing its influence in the region, and not as a military tool. In general, the mathematics of the dangers of launching and continuing traditional confrontations between Iran and the United States and various states in the region would change if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. This could lead to further restrictions. However, it can also create the potential to unleash the traditional confrontation and use of nuclear weapons.

In light of these prospects, President Ahmadinejad's nuclear program was declared necessary for the overall scientific and technological development of President Ahmadine's presidency. President Ahmadinejad recalled previous events in which the great powers had blocked Iran's acquisition of technology and even built railroads and steel, demanding Western technology to oppose Iran's nuclear program.

The US imposed sanctions and changed Iran's behavior through a UN resolution. These binding diplomatic tools, in combination with US government officials who blame Iran's actions in some respects, have broadened relations with Iran for some time.

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