

Russian- Ukraine War and its Impact on the Current World Order

Muhammad Atif Assistant Professor, School of Integrated Social Sciences, The University of Lahore, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.

Bilal Ahmed Lecturer, Department of Pakistan Studies, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University, Dir Upper, KP, Pakistan.

Abdul Haseeb Khan Visiting Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Chakwal & International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan.

Corresponding Author: Muhammad Atif (Assistant Professor, School of Integrated Social Sciences, The University of Lahore, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.
Email: muhammad.atif@siss.uol.edu.pk)



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Abstract: *The current world order is declining. The rapid decrease in US control and the concurrent expansion of China altered the liberal, rules-based system when first ruled by the Americas and their allies. Frequent financial meltdown, wage stagnation, revived protectionist policies, the COVID-19 disease outbreak and increasing dependence on sanctions imposed have carried the post-cold War era of internationalization to a finish. Moscow's attack on Ukraine might have revived NATO but also reinforced the East and West divisions. In the meantime, transferring national preferences in several states and intense competition in world affairs have stopped the desire for economic cooperation and censored collaborative initiatives to deal with rising worldwide risks. The global system that will originate from such trends is difficult to forecast. However, it is simple to imagine a much less flourishing and much more dangerous globe defined by incredibly aggressive America and China relations in coming years. The Russian-Ukraine war also brought a remilitarized Europe, more forward geographic and financial alliances, a technology-based real-world split across geostrategic boundaries, and the increasing militarization of trade cooperation for geopolitical endpoints...*

Key Words: Russian- Ukraine War, New World Order, European Union, NATO, Dollar Dominance, Liberal Order

Introduction

The US-led West governing coalition has controlled world affairs internationally via multilateralism and military actions, especially since the ending of the Soviet Union (Leeuwen, 2015). This Euro-centric coalition way to try to generalize Western liberal democracy, permitting America to validate its military adventurism in Iraq and Afghanistan (Fukuyama, 1992) (Hearst, 2021). Regrettably, a specific strategy induced a leadership vacuum across both states and social unrest that contributed to introducing and enhancing novel strategies in world affairs. Ultimately, this US-defined power structure in global affairs has experienced difficulties from

Russian and Chinese, and also developing powers like India, Brazil and Turkey (Abdelaziz, 2023). In emerging trends, Moscow is looking to go back in time to the full glory of a Soviet regime and the Union Of soviet socialist republics that use potential threat, hostility and persuasion, like the instance of the Ukraine attack (Serhan, 2022) (WIRES, 2023). Besides that, China and Turkey are confident regarding an extensive restructuring of the globalized world. Finally, according to the kingdom, Saudi Arabia's OPEC member's action to decrease oil production was created relying primarily on "financial concerns" as it denied allegations that the action was motivated by politics against America (Mohamed, 2022).

The origin of a current international order can

all be dated directly to the French 1789 Revolution and the resulting outcomes just after the War Of 1812. France's revolutionary political and social transformation throughout those centuries transformed the world among global and regional frameworks, affecting numerous doctrines from around the globe. In the coming years, geopolitics was controlled mainly through the concept of German unification and advancement and British and French colonization. This fight was finished by the First WW1, among the most destructive wars in human civilization.

After ww1, the League of Nations was set up relying on liberal values to stop all conflicts and protect peace in the world. In comparison, the post-war order was wrecked mostly by the Peace Treaty of 1919, as well recognized as a "harmony to finish all harmony", and it formed the basis for countless successive disputes. (AYDIN & GAFARLI, 2019) (Fromkin, 2009) The efforts to reshape the post-First World War order occurred in World War 2. The collapse of a League of Nations to eliminate a further big war ultimately laid the foundation for what is now recognized as United Nations (U.N.), an inter-governmental structure that aspires to stop the potential dispute and protects human rights and social well-being (AYDIN, 2020). Although the new multilateralism was established to stay out of the war, conflicts between the United States and the USSR sparked the Cold War, isolating states and multilateral organizations into two main centres: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Cold War ended with the USA owing to the global order and trying to impose European principles on other countries. However, its governance in the current international recession has come into question. Rising BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations have pushed for rethinking the status quo.

Russia has long produced an effective method to global affairs in resistance to the Western allies (Applebaum, Graham, & Kotkin, Russia and the West: A Historical Perspective, 2017) s. This method has a long history as it ceased the progressions of Bonaparte and, extra notably, Hitler. Moreover, Moscow was quite destabilized after the demise of the Soviet

Union, as well as its appropriate philosophy against European politicians and the capitalist model changed course. Then under Putin, the Soviet Union hoped to restore its reactionary origin to restore the nation's glory days, as Putin clearly stated on a TV show, Modern Russian Heritage, telecast on the Russian state TV station Rossiya 1 in December 2021 (Chotiner, Vladimir Putin's Revisionist History of Russia and Ukraine, 2022) The Russian President said, Over all else, we must recognize that the fall of the USSR was a significant global tragedy of a hundred years. Concerning the Russian country, it turned into a truthful play (DW, 2022). "Millions and millions of with us co-citizens and co-patriots identified themselves beyond Russian borders.

Moreover, the disintegration epidemic infected Russia." For Moscow, the US expansionism launched a "violation" of world politics. Putin's strong condemnation of the Western-centered global order unipolar world at the 2007 Munich Security Conference was preceded by the attack of Georgia in 2008 (FRIED & VOLKER, 2022). With modern advances, Moscow uses military capability in post-Soviet territories, especially in Ukraine, and also militarized energy supply to the West. This poses a threat to US global dominance and creates a new form of rebalancing to world affairs.

The need for rewriting history also can be identified via the operations of multilateral institutions such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Internationally, they have enhanced their global influence in the present era. Further, states like Turkey also initiated to demand a new global order. Like an emerging economy, Turkey was trying to enhance the Group of Turkic Countries and stated that broader changes must be made in the framework of the UN, particularly the Security Council. Professor Fahrettin Altun, Turkey's communications director, highlights in his latest book the need for a more equitable world order - which correctly reflects differing landmasses, religious sects, roots and civilizations - if such UN desires to stay appropriate and credible in the twenty-first century (Altun, 2021).

Compared to Russian and American military adventurism, China needs very little worldwide adventurism, assistance for several intergovernmental actions and social rules, and dignity for the policy positions of nations that hinder the importance of fundamental human freedoms (Jones, 2022). China's Belt and Road Initiative contribute significantly to China in Asia, Africa and Europe. Chinese nearshore investment opportunities are supporting China in developing global influence worldwide. Consequently, China has often favoured continuity over the dispute, launching the propaganda of preserving fairness in global conflicts like the Eastern Mediterranean controversy, wherein China's European and Middle Eastern stakeholders create conflict (Aydin & Kahraman, 2019). Whereas most disputes in the African continent are domestic, China still faces an increasing challenge to its worth billions of dollars in developments, varying from railroads and overpasses to oil and gas agreements. (Nyabiage, 2022) To consist any internal struggle and protect people from changing into broader regional turmoil, China has already played an assertive position, establishing military facilities and meditational efforts (Miller, 2022) (Nantulya, 2022). Given such situations, it's possible to conclude that the era of uni-polar or bipolar international order is closing. Big powers are currently in the direction of accessing a multipolar globe. And what's lacking is multilateralism, or active arbitration, which could prevent the globe from carrying a much more difficult route and assist in limiting the effects of nuclear war (Hudson, 2022).

Theoretical Framework

The goal of this theoretical framework is to give a dynamic analysis of how different theories of international relations relate to the conflict involving Russia and Ukraine. In some sense, this section aims to discourse about the "Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its impact on the Current World Order" from the viewpoint of international political theories and empirical analysis of how the current evolution of the Ukraine war reveals global political theories. IR theories of realism concentrate on power; also, for years, they preserved that the bloc politics of the Soviet Era and the post-Cold

War era of the globe ruled by the Western world were comparatively simple structures not vulnerable to conflicts or mistakes (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979) (Wohlforth, Summer, 1999). They also kept that nuclear weapons increased the expense of dispute and declared fight between the powerful states unimaginable (Waltz, 1990).

"Realism," wrote Robert Keohane in 2020, "about its obsessive focus on conflict, becomes facing a reemergence" (Keohane, 2021). The massive Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reassured realist Stephen Walt of such viewpoint "everlasting importance" considering the world's lawless nature, "where there isn't any organization or agency that could defend countries from one another (Walt, 2022). Yet, realism is often perceived negatively. Paul Poast mentions, "The sourpuss of global politics considered," reassuring others with "the inertia that downplays human being efforts to the wing" (Poast, 2022). While realism encompasses a wide range of viewpoints, it is usual for realists to characterize world affairs or world power dynamics as "tragic" (Kaplan, 2022) (Mearsheimer, 2014). Ideas such as the norms of international order are being discarded as the challenge of dealing with an unappealing but actual environment is put down (Porter, 2016).

Realists' role in evaluating the Russia-Ukraine conflict raised additional concerns about the method's value. A contributing factor is the odd statements made by academic John Mearsheimer about Putin's objectives in Ukraine (Chotiner, 2022). Yet, this cannot be the only explanation. Moscow's massive intervention, and Ukrainians' response to it, generated a conflict among European hypotheses regarding state actions and human Factors (Applebaum, 2022). Realism for such connection with the "concept that Moscow must possess its realm of concern, such as Kyiv, and a veto amid NATO invasion" both for ethical and logical reasons. (Luce, 2022) Yet, as researchers Nicholas Ross Smith and Grant Dawson notice, this and many other critics need to disagree mainly against structural realism in International relations, disregarding other options (Smit & Dawson, 2022).

According to the liberal conception of global politics, governments may be influenced

by global organizations, democratization, and collaboration (Keohane, 1984). Liberals believe that nations are driven to cooperate for the sake of mutual advantage and that international bodies may help make this happen by establishing a common set of principles and standards for countries to follow (Keohane, 1984). Liberals believe free trade and economic integration between nations are crucial to maintaining global order (Keohane, 1984).

In the meantime, liberal scholars claim that three different factors (institutions, interdependence, and democracy) fostered collaboration and resolved disputes. First, the complex series of international organizations and treaties (U.N.O, W.T.O, N.P.T, etc.) created after 1945 spread. They concentrated on after the end of the bloc politics that provided meetings for great powers to resolve their contrasts peaceably (Keohane, 1984). Besides that, globalization's military action is costly (Gartzke, 2007). Why conflict while the economy is flourishing and every person is gaining rich? At last, based on these theorists, democratic nations are rarer interested in fighting but more likely to collaborate, and the massive tides of democracy all around the world in the last seven decades have transformed the world into a pretty pleasant place to live (Russett, 29 November 1994).

The constructivist concept of global affairs emphasizes the significance of concepts like ideas, norms, and identity in explaining the actions of countries (Wendt, 1992). Constructivists contend that states are influenced by money and the ideas and values that give them their unique identities and perspectives on the world (Wendt, 1992). Similarly, constructivists hold that governments and other players establish norms and practices that influence global affairs (Wendt, 1992). In addition, constructivist theorists clarified how fresh ideas, norms, and identities have converted global affairs into a quite progressive position (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2005). In the previous era, pirating, colonialism, violence, and aggressive wars were regular occurrences. So over decades; moreover, enhancing norms of human rights and prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons put safeguards on global war. Regrettably, now almost each of these

placating powers arises to be unpicking until our sight. As per IR theory, the primary drivers of global affairs indicate that the emerging Cold War between the West bloc (the U.S. and Europe) and East bloc (China and Russia) is highly improbable to be peace-loving.

EU Losing Their Political Impact

The 2008 worldwide financial crisis was the outcome of the breakdown of liberalization. Although in past fiscal recessions like in Mexico (1994-95), Argentina (1995) and East Asia (1997). These financial losses were domestic, but they hit record huge international ratios during the global recession. There was a generated public backlash after the wake of the incident; there was a generated public backlash. Greek experiences and their impacts were realized across the EU, resulting in question marks about its economic and political unity. The refugee recession in 2015, deriving from Iraq and Syrian battles, caused a rise in Xenophobia and racism.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which entered the EU as an aspect of its eastern expansion, recognized the popular domestic industry and economic alliance but have refused vast portions of the unification and the liberal principles of the EU. Moreover, due to their rejection to comply with current promises to safeguard migrants in contravention of European Union law, the EU went into a position of massive trouble. Also, domestic disputes inside the EU and highly volatile cooperation with the US under the Trump regime have greatly diminished the EU as a global international political player.

In his 2009 statements on the recognition of the Noble Peace Prize in Oslo, American President Obama recognized that organizations and agreements never purely attained the post-cold War world order but that the U.S. had financed international stability for the last sixty years. Before speaking, he had also declared the plan to leave Iraq and Afghanistan. In actuality, President launched a strategy change that emphasized US global goals from Afghanistan and the Middle East to the Asian Pacific through armed services setup and the emergence of the Trans-Pacific New Agreement in 2015-2017 (Connor &

Cooper, [2021](#)). The President's action to transfer the US strategic attention to the South China Sea has had implications for Chinese and Russian international relations. China had hard started expanding its impact by utilizing the World trade organization, which it entered in 2001, to affirm its increasing statement of global dominance.

During this period, with the support of Russia, China developed an emerging structure of multilateralism; the BRICS trade bloc was created in 2009, whose members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. China also created CRA (Contingent Reserve Arrangement) and a New Development Bank under the umbrella of BRICS in 2015 and 2014, respectively. Furthermore 2001, China created SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) for regional security. Furthermore, China introduced the "One Belt, One Road" action plan in 2014 (Wuthnow, October [2017](#)).

The increased popularity of the BRI for Moscow's freedom from the West, associated with the slowdown of the EU by deep divisions and incompatibilities, including its allied forces, particularly the US and eventually Turkey, has made opportunities for Moscow to create its own and supplied it with newfound identity. The populist right and the revival of nationalism in Europe and the U.S.A provided the basis for Leaving the European Union and enhanced totalitarian governments. To the deadline, the EU cannot replace the space created by the lack of a US leader. It was especially apparent after President Donald accorded with the Taliban to leave US military forces from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden accomplished (Castella-McDonald, [2021](#)). Germany struggled to exit several native aid groups from the state, even though it was apparent for days — that the US planned to exit its army despite facing definite retaliation from the Taliban. They now need to be afraid for their own human life and the survival of their family members.

World at A Pivotal Time: Democracy to Authoritarianism

Russia's ties with Europe have been broken due to Russia's invasion of Kyiv, the most damaging dispute on European territory in almost 80 years. As a result, Russian representatives have

had to endure some uncomfortable encounters, particularly during the G20 conference. President Macron of France, who previously urged his peers not to embarrass Moscow, has firmly favoured Ukraine (D'EMILIO, [2022](#)) (GALINDO, [2022](#)). Russia, on the other hand, is not entirely separated. While many nations outside the West would welcome a rapid ending to the conflict, others are clearly in Russia's favour. Since August, Tehran has reportedly delivered dozens of combat drones to Russia, and it is prepared to provide short-range missile systems to replenish Russia's arsenal (Nakashima & Warrick, [2022](#)) (Atwood, [2022](#)). In addition, North Korea is allegedly sending Russian military ammo to Russia via the Arab World, according to U.S. intelligence (Demirjian, DeYoung, & Nakashima, [2022](#)). And although Beijing has refrained from supplying Russia with military backing, it has remained Putin's most significant strategic and financial umbrella; China has become Russia's most prominent commercial ally and has picked up considerable volumes of Russian oil products, enabling Putin to compensate for the shrinking European marketplace (Stamer, [2022](#)). From this, some have concluded that the countries of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are on the verge of forging a global alliance of authoritarian regimes (Rogin, [2022](#)).

The prevailing geopolitical dynamics are not encouraging liberty. Totalitarian nations have increased active uprisings, and the lot of nations going towards authoritarian is greater than the number of states going towards democratization (Casas-Zamora, [2022](#)). States throughout each part of the globe have seen rising human rights violations in the past few years, according to Freedom House. Humankind is in shock as tyrants everywhere double down, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Myanmar, and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The anti-American coalition that China, Russia, and Iran build involves strategic collaboration and misinformation, although these countries have serious disagreements (Repucci & Slipowitz, [2022](#)). Russia and Iran have affected the Arab World by backing Bashar Assad in Syria and other anti-democratic groups throughout the continent. Meanwhile, the U.S. abruptly left Iraq, turned a blind eye to horrors in Syria, left Afghanistan in the hands of the Taliban, and

did little to advance the Abraham Agreements. (PIERCE, [2023](#))

This fall's meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was a bleak omen of the future of liberty. Both nations have negotiated significant financial deals in resources and infrastructure and deepened their relationships in the power generation and military sectors. (Agence France-Presse, [2022](#)) The Arab League, chaired by Saudi Arabia, issued a declaration condemning Taiwan's freedom and supporting China's "initiatives" and "stance" in Hong Kong, which is detrimental to civil rights.

Complicating the damage is the United States and its allied forces' failure to denounce censure and discourage growing wars and crimes. For example, in Ukraine, the West's response to Russia's war dangers was too weak, and it equipped Kyiv too slowly as genocide unfolded. Like in Tehran, the Biden administration made naive political efforts against the cruel dictatorship despite expressing limited sympathy for the citizens. To effectively react to this time, which is both dangerous and promising, it will be necessary to reevaluate post-Cold War beliefs and go back to the learning of the Second World War. Russia and China have had frightening successes with all-encompassing brainwashing and constant pressure. Yet that is another factor for democratic countries to demonstrate and promote a substitute, particularly considering the human rights violations such authorities perpetrate and the existing boiling disaffection between Russian and Chinese citizens. (PIERCE, [2023](#))

Russian- Ukraine War and Decline of Dollar Dominance

Many political and security variables are now working to limit the United States dollar's dominance (Robertson, [2022](#)). The dollar was in danger even before the pace of globalization accelerated. In recent years, however, the US dollar has been challenged by several factors, including China's emergence as a prospective emerging economy, Russia's suspension from the dollar-driven Banking network, and a worldwide economic downturn. The shift away from dollarization is not relatively new.

Throughout the 1990s, several countries in Latin America explored alternatives to the dollar. Once the United States imposed restrictions, Venezuela looked to China for help in making oil deliveries (Çağatay, 2017). Chile abandoned the dollar in the 1980s and has, more broadly, resisted dollarization throughout its history (Herrera & Valdés, [2004](#)). The Iraqi government sought to export oil in euros in the 2000s, although the Libyan government pushed for a pan-African standard of gold (Recknagel, [2000](#)) (Brown, [2016](#)). Yet the worldwide economic downturn of 2007-08 halted this tendency towards de-dollarization. Throughout the recent ten years, no breakthrough has arisen to challenge the US strength of dollar supremacy. Instead, a new threat to the dollar's value has emerged with growing tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Two minor but essential bits of current events in recent days are clear clues that the worldwide financial system, based on the dominance of the dollar, is gradually disintegrating, posing the possibility of drastically exacerbated uncertainty. First, the Saudi Arabian minister of finance initially stated that the Saudi government has "no problem" with accepting alternate currencies to sell oil (Omar & Cranny, [2023](#)). Although Saudi Arabia has voiced numerous comments over the years, the timing of such a new recommendation is fascinating given that Chinese President Xi Jinping pushed Gulf nations to adopt the renminbi for the payment of petroleum & energy deals with Beijing during the inaugural China-Arab Countries Meeting, convened with much fanfare by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in Riyadh latter year (Summer & Kalin, [2022](#)) (Yeranian, [2022](#)). The globe must take notice of this decision from Saudi Arabia since it is the most significant petroleum products supplier and was (unless now) a central pillar of American policy in the Arab States. Saudi Arabia and Russia, the global highest two oil producers, cannot have to depend on the dollar as the exclusive medium of exchange for their products. Beijing is the biggest oil purchaser worldwide; in past years, Saudi Arabia has grown closer to this country. During Last year's conference, both parties reiterated their "strong backing" for one another and signed

many business and technological agreements (AGENCIES, 2022). One such agreement was with Huawei, a Chinese technology company, to deliver cloud technology and high-tech equipment for towns in Saudi Arabia, despite US sanctions (Yaakoubi & Baptista, 2022). Introducing a new "petroyuan" may solidify this rift in the global economy (EIU, 2022).

On the opposite side of the globe, Brazil and Argentina have announced that they are also considering adopting a reserve currency for interstate commerce, this time creating a new currency, maybe dubbed the "sur." Several previous attempts to construct combined Brazilian-Argentine currencies failed due to

geopolitical resistance from both nations' financial institutions (Meredith, 2023). However, now that both nations have handed and unbiased administrations, there may be a stronger inclination to attempt to create an alternate currency outside of the dollarization. According to preliminary studies, it will not be used in domestic retail instead of paying transactions in international commerce (Meadway, 2023). These nations know the difficulties connected, but if more South American nations were encouraged to enter, the currency might eventually serve as a substitute for the dollar system.

Table 1

World - Official Foreign Exchange Reserves by Currency (US Dollars. Billions)

	Q3 2021	Q4 2021	Q1 2022	Q2 2022	Q3 2022
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves	12,823.88	12,918.50	12,541.98	12,032.44	11,598.63
Allocated Reserves	11,970.21	12,048.13	11,680.06	11,172.45	10,773.07
Claims in U.S. dollars	7,092.31	7,085.69	6,874.98	6,653.00	6,441.65
Claims in euro	2,456.73	2,481.34	2,342.15	2,207.84	2,117.94
Claims in Chinese renminbi	321.26	337.26	335.71	319.42	297.79
Claims in Japanese yen	679.68	665.1	630.05	577.45	566.43
Claims in pounds sterling	558.6	579.38	571.97	541.69	497.33
Claims in Australian dollars	214.24	221.32	222.33	209.98	206.26
Claims in Canadian dollars	264.27	286.93	287.32	277.83	264.15
Claims in Swiss francs	23.77	20.79	29.48	27.92	25.04
Claims in other currencies	359.36	370.31	386.08	357.32	356.47
Unallocated Reserves	853.67	870.37	861.92	860	825.56

Ordering of the currencies follows SOR basket weights (SOR currencies) and alphabetical order (non-SOR currencies).

Including in dire situations, like the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, traders flocked to deposit their capital in US dollars because they were seen as a secure method for foreign investment because of the United States' vast financial system. China is still the globe's leading supplier and is rapidly growing to rival the United States as a proportion of GDP. Still, it only controls a small percentage of the globe's foreign exchange reserves. The state's financial restrictions are mostly to blame for this situation. Cash flow is needed for the financial system and Federal Reserve. The yuan lacks an open and unregulated financial system in which it may be deposited or where businesses based in the yuan may benefit them. Yet it doesn't rule out the potential of a shake-up in the worldwide financial order that would make the yuan a stronger potent backup currency. Maybe for the first time in human experience, the worldwide financial structure

will become more decentralized, with multiple competing economic zones and multiple successful currencies maintaining local and regional predominance (Chulain, 2022). An upcoming financial structure might influence multiple methods for explaining the purpose of international investment through multiple currencies that will impact on current world order.

Russian- Ukraine War and Current World Order

Moscow's conflict of hostility in Ukraine should be realized against the background of NATO's advancement to Russia's Western edge in the 1990s, amid concerns by the West to the opposite. The USA's airstrikes on Serbia in 1993 prompted the Russian government to think that the U.S.S.R may once more perform an applicable global influence only within a multipolarity. This initiated a reimagining

method in Russia in 1996, demonstrated by Moscow travelling its Stabilization Force (SFOR) soldiers from Bosnia to Pristina in 1999 to avoid future still progress of NATO-affiliated Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers and to protect Serbia from missing other lands (Kaiser & Hoffman, 1999). The bomb attack on Serbia in 1993 and the 2nd War in Iraq in 2003, conducted beside a UN mission, raised questions about the US leader and ended in the continuing deterioration of US dedication to democratic principles and treaty obligations.

The 2nd War in Iraq changed foreign relations and challenged its dedication to the global system and civil liberties (Sciurba, 2022). In confronting emerging international security issues, the U.S. depended on Cold War approaches to progress geostrategic and financial desires across a strong military. Strangely, the US tries to develop its geostrategic and global security goals in the Middle East to enhance the impact of both China and Russia in the geographical area. On the other hand, Moscow seeks the U.S.'s unsuccessful task of gaining harmony in Iraq, Libya, and Syria as an advantage to affirm its position as a geopolitical influence in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iran. Moreover, Moscow has been redeploying in the past years; presently, it has the 2nd most extensive nuclear arsenal and is the 2nd best-armed force in aspects of military capability after the United States (GFP, 2022).

This upsurge of Chinese and Russian as army and geostrategic stakeholders correlated with the rising global influence of the BRICS multilateral alliance and offered a significant input counterforce to the Americas and Europe in world commerce (Chang-Liao, 2023). The new financial and political condition of the BRICS states is one of the primary motivations for the incompetency of the European economic sanctions on Moscow in 2014, just after the territorial expansion of Crimea (Pavicevic, 2022). The Crimean expansion, the toxins of Russian leader of the opposition Alexei Navalny in August 2020, similar days Lukashenko's electoral success in Belarus and his national socialist immigrant policy backed by Russia played a significant role in more turmoil of the relationship between EU and Russia (Westbrook, 2020). Poland's refusal to recognize refugees as EU

participants also played into the hands of Belarus and helped Russia.

Moscow instructed his forces to conquer Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (AGENCIES, 2022). This act of Moscow separated the Charter of the United Nations and international treaties. Moscow's aggressive behaviour against Ukraine is not just an unhappy high point in the intensification between Ukraine and Russia but between Russia and the NATO forces. However, the problematic financial restrictions, like suspending engagement in the SWIFT money transfer and the massive issuance of Russian resources, have not inspired Putin to surrender. Also, on the opposite, well before the General Meeting of G7, he once more challenged the site of nuclear missiles in Belarus (Maler, 2022).

Moscow's strong signal and repeating caution to the West is that U.S.S.R will fire missiles that have been protected- if Europe provides Ukraine with long-range weapons that approach Russian territory (AFP, 2022). What that proves is anybody's estimate; it may indicate one more intensification of the battle in nearby European states. Moscow reportedly announced that if Ukraine accepted short or medium-missile systems, Moscow would take the outcomes and then use methods of destabilization, of which Moscow has plenty. There are signs that its world is moving into a novel bipolar age, in which China, Russia and their allied countries would reflect yet another pole and the U.S.A., Europe and their own allied countries another pole (Flockhart & Korosteleva, 2022).

The BRICS, CRA and the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), which already consists of many Asian states as continental representatives, in addition to 17 NATO states parties, indicate that China, Russia and other states portray a substitute to the West-based international institutions. Such factors point to the American government realizing that the efforts to persuade China to associate with the U.S., starting with Nixon's tour to Beijing in 1972, were a mistake. Like other US foreign relations setbacks, this symbolized a revolutionary shift from the past. This included prohibitions on Chinese new tech and economic tariffs that threatened the emergence of the WTO.

On 23 July 2020, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a policy statement in a seminar, namely Communist China and the Free World's Future," he says "U.S. could no longer overlook basic democratic philosophical distinctions among our states, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never neglected them" (Pompeo, [2020](#)). It clearly stated such a renewed cold war between China and the US. Whereas the Biden government has scaled back the cold war expression, its financial and commerce laws are equally assertive as those pursued by his forerunner. Based on the security plan, people are now in a multipolarity in which Russia has control to believe a critical position through its hard power. BRICS, BRI and the China International Payment Method (CIPS), similar to a U.S Banking Network, clarify why the present sanctions on Russia are not attaining the victory the West needs. The fact that the new international order would be "multi-order" instead of "multi-polar" is significant (Flockhart & Korosteleva, *War in Ukraine: Putin and the multi-order world*, [2022](#)). The geopolitical patterns of a multi-order world will occur inside and between distinct global levels instead of among various sovereign nations, marking a significant departure from the status quo and highlighting the need to shift to a multi-order international structure (Flockhart, [2016](#)). So, it is crucial to take advantage of the remaining chances and persistently explore novel approaches to join the coming global order (Kortunov, [2022](#)).

Conclusion

The unfolding of the post-war order is now in overdrive. For many, the collapse of the Russian Empire has been labelled the rejection of a Marxist centrally planned economic system and the victory of free markets. However, in recent economic breakdowns, such as the 2008 recession and the increasing social inequality in income growth, studies have found neoliberalism (market) capitalist system can cause economic, political, and social marginalization. This puts into doubt the world dominance of democratic countries. In recent times, by their geostrategic, political and economic strength, Beijing and Moscow have

countered the system of democracy under the American power structure. The lack of control of the West is especially apparent in its dealing with the Russian invasion of Ukrainian. E.U's reliance on Russian gas and Ukraine's influential position in worldwide wheat deliveries create a quick ending to the conflict's increasing importance, even as China, the significant totalitarian regime globally, is empowered in its outlook on the weakening impact of the Western world. China could become the novel dominant power amidst its centralized economic system and rejection of civil rights.

The collaboration between Beijing and Moscow, mainly through solid trade treaties like BRICS and the BRI via the CHIPS payment network, has inaugurated a new global order. However, it stays to be noticed if, beyond the economic and philosophical contest between the US and China, there is going to be a significant conflict in the China Sea and if China, Russia and the West will pursue a clash in the fight for supplies or if there will yet be an emerging world collaboration under Chinese management in the climate change battle. Lastly, military interventions and the world financial practices of the present era have put the states greatest impacted by global warming the fewest equipped to safeguard themselves from its impacts.

Developing states struggle hugely from the impacts of ecological damage, by which China and the US carry the sole obligation. In the Russia-Ukraine war, no part has seemed to follow an approach of de-escalation. So at the moment, which speedily wants to call for collaboration, our globe has become growingly divided and collapsing into troubling geographic power blocs, which are frequently patriotic and illiberal in voice. America's try to subvert Moscow's revival ability to rule through sanctions imposed is not a sound approach; Moscow's interests in the region should be considered credible, particularly in close collaboration with China. Beijing is widening its influence in the region by offering alternative approaches to a US capitalist model while utilizing the current structure and worldwide system of governance, including its power sphere in its best interest.

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