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## India's Claim for Pacifism & Arms Modernization: Changing Postures and Outcomes for Pakistan

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### Abstract

*This article highlights the aims under Indian Prime Minister Modi concerning to foreign policy of India since 2014. Moreover, it determines those factors that are working as an impetus along with great powers intentions and motives behind them in playing such geostrategic politics in different dimensions, specifically in the nuclear relationship of India and Pakistan. It will also be summarised the assistance and neutrality of Asian power, United States role in South Asia. This paper evaluates the prospects of escalation and de-escalation furthermore as it will discuss the opacity of No First Use, logic and attempt for eradication. This article critically analyses the changing postures in terms of nuclear motivations, the ideology of the Hindutva effect and the comparison of arms and weapons, which are creating risks of miscalculations and essentially at the core of the stability-instability paradox. An attempt is also made to shed light on the core elements that are formulating under Modi.*

**Key Words:** No First Use, Pacifism, Interests-Roles, Foreign Policy, Future Prospects, Pakistan, India

### Introduction

Despite declaring a formal policy of no first use still there is a worrisome matter of concern about it, specifically at some turning points. India might have the capability to utilisation of its nukes earlier, specifically in times of military crisis. About its possibility, there is some evidence which shows about political leadership thoughts without considering full implications of NFU. A comment made by the then PM Vajpayee revealed that response towards threats from Pakistan side; “if they think that we will watch for them to throw a bomb from their side and for severe damage, they are mistaken in their viewpoint”. Clearly interpreting such assertion shows that WMD might

be launched “before” step taken by competitor means in advance the nuclear weapon explodes from the opponent side. His statement thus didn't specify the use of nukes. ([Sundaram & Ramana, 2018](#))

One may take the interpretation of the statement as it claims; nuclear deterrence typically rests upon the possibility, not on the inevitability of their usage, whereas the second reason expresses about nuclear threats almost always involved such sort of veiled language. The concept of first use merely first put forth by Vipin Narang, who constructed a discussion on former NSA (National

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Security Advisor) Shivshankar Menon quote, who expressed that the current policy of India has greater flexibility than it gets credits for. Furthermore, it highlighted the prospective grey area when they would use their munitions earlier against other states who have this nuclear power and the second sentence straightforwardly stated conceivable circumstances in which India might find it useful in initiating an advance strike. In sum, he presented a scenario that India could get access to commence pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons if.

Indian Commander in Chief Nagal made discussion on the choice that needs to be made later on to the cope-with the existing nuclear policy, by mentioning namely first use, i.e., pre-emption includes either on Launch on Launch and other Launch on Warning. The military has had an inclination towards the adoption of such LOL-LOW doctrines. Efforts show intentions to develop the first use of nukes as Bharat Karnad pointed out certain developments in this arena do indeed make possible of first strike and on-going process of arsenals the canisterising of Agni missiles. Demating of nuclear warheads and delivery systems have been India's strategy-y so that to support their commitment to NFU.

Canisterising configuration, deployment of missiles all such steps thus mark the effort of moving away from NFU. Hence, it suggests that India's laying the foundation for changing NFU as its employment policy of nuclear arms. (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018) In the wake of on-going hostility between Indo-Pak due to Kashmir issue the dangerous nuclear flashpoint for both, under such circumstances, the likely shift probably has lasting ramifications for entire regional harmony. For instance, PM Imran Khan condemned the shift as a "not-so-veiled" nuclear threat to Pakistan, but a change in policy condemned by Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood, irresponsible and highly unfortunate reflective of India's belligerent behaviour.

Shifting trends enhancements of missiles developments and of space capabilities all shows India's heading towards deterrence context containing second-strike retaliatory capabilities, and that shift is noticeable from their employment of counterforce approach rather than to counter value

tactic to nuclear warfare. The shift in NFU wouldn't surprise Pakistan strategic calculus as they have long doubts about them anyway. (H. B. Malik, 2019). Critiques of NFU underline the fact that choosing an initial strike at some stage could only be the way in punishing Pakistan. Thus, all rely on thinking, the way such thoughtful lines change the potential role of nukes for both states, which forces them from war-prevention to warfighting. In concern to Pakistan, if India opts for FU, the purpose of doctrine will then be limited to "retaliate only". In sum, India's changing of policy that leaves Pakistan fully capable of retaliating in response would be cast way too prohibitive for India to suffer as well; thus, it will have severe upshots on the India-Pakistan crisis or in peacetime deployments of both countries. (Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, 2019)

The doctrinal shift has widened to include the aggressive posture from India's adversary. At present, now realist-pragmatic faction appears due to which the *reputational commitment* towards strategies, posture and policies all are now under realist command. Advocacy to reserve option of nuclear first strike is part of realist-pragmatism; all shows warning signals rather than as an indication of shift. In the 2019 elections, the Modi manifesto fully skipped mentioning of determination means *Sankalp* to shift existing doctrine as mentioned in the 2014 elections. (Sitakanta Mishra, 2019)

Giving up of No First Use and heading towards first use means NFU incompatibility with nuclear deterrence of nuclearised arms. As another option apart from NFU, the FU be able to have the purpose of non-nuclear deterrence, however only in that case if the fear of non-nuclear exists or perceived danger to occur. For Pakistan and Israel, the initiative of first use makes sense because of non-nuclear existential perceived threats by both. Since Pakistan's achievement of nuclear power, that was not a reply to India's nuclear programme; however, to India's demo of unambiguous conventional military power back to the war of December 1971. In India's case, who has not perceived any threat nor extended any commitment with deterrence. Nuclear first strike makes sense for those states that are fronting with certain deaths in both cases, either conventional or nuclear threats.

First use in their doctrine presumably makes India free from getting bound with NFU, and that consequence of retaliation, in any case, will be devastating by keeping into view the nature of nuclear weapons. Considering the strategic logic of NFU policy and the futility of abandoning such existing policy leads towards distrust, that such proposals conceptually propels short-cuts which demonstrate to *sort out* rather than to react towards Indian strategic glitches. (Rajagopalan, 2019) As regards to NFU pledge, current Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh expressed that it will depend upon future circumstances and they are not strictly adhered to an existing policy which shows a hint for giving up NFU policy. That ominous threat was absolutely targeted to Pakistan with the probability to launch a preventative strike to discourage adversary attack against India's conventional forces in forthcoming conflicts.

The question raised on giving up of NFU either India could be able to afford such serious costs in result, it has a serious cost for their own state security if change the policy of NFU and credibility to their nuclear doctrine as well as adopted the assertive option but eventually, in their attempt, in initiating the first strike against Pakistan particularly because such deterrence posture would definitely become questionable. BJP leader threatened Pakistan by referring phrase "Qatal Ki Raat" the night of a murder, mobilised missiles along the international border so that to give a signal to Pakistan but without changing the existing NFU policy. Interestingly, it might have possibilities that India would opt for two asymmetric options, giving up of NFU and minimum deterrence in China's context, whereas on the other hand, to own more capability for an all-inclusive pre-emptive strike in contra to Pakistan. (Sultan, 2020)

After the annulment of Kashmir special status, Rajnath provoked a flurry of apocalyptic warnings from neighbouring Pakistan, and that dismisses NFU about nuclear firestorm between both states. Manmohan Singh, the former PM, described their country as a reluctant one's in regard to a nuclear weapon, but that reluctance finds such expressions in existing NFU policy, as nukes are political tool where-as lesser hold of the military on useable weapons to use against adversary state. Modi put

an end to the speculation that there would be no doctrinal review stated publicly. (Thakur, 2019)

### Strategic Logic behind No First Use Doctrine

One of logic to adopt such policy as advanced by country diplomats for the reason to represent state posture as a responsible one, and thereby an only way to persist from several kinds of pressures in the signing of any treaties which might affect their nuclear weapons and further progress in it. Moreover, mentioned in the DND document about the adoption of the NFU policy, one is to deter the usage or any risk of utilising by other country or for securing own state, while other include retaliation which will respond with *punitive retaliation* without initiating a nuclear first strike. (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018) However, aggressive nuclear policies raising serious concerns for nuclear conflict in the region, though NFU policy in itself holds a promise which composes logic which is effective and simple in true terms that *you don't destroy me and in return, I will not nuke you*.

Modi, who also called the existing policy a part of their *cultural heritage* but for the predecessor of Singh, Manohar Parrikar, wondered that why should he be bound with it. Indian critics fanaticised about to use weapons first and further provoking the early use of weapons in the conflict before Pakistan nuclear forces fired against their state. Away from existing policy looks just to give cosmetic change in it if decision-makers would go for hard choices or in increasing military investments just in that case. Perhaps at some level, phrase suits it a lot about *much ado about nothing*, to which the (ret'd) General Khalid Kidwai referred it as Indian statements are concentrating on domestic gallery just for presentation, so far new macho conduct included that such statements are far from reality and have no operational connotations in Pakistan's context. (Dalton, 2019)

The bedrock of India's nuclear doctrine NFU also holds logic that usage will be limited, ensure national survivability. The sole purpose of acquiring nuclear arsenals indeed was for deterrence from other states nuclear powers and to retaliate in the answer is the only way to use such weapons. As the threat of retaliation is the only way that presents the essence of deterrence, and NFU is just an outcome

of such strategic logic. Additionally, other benefits it contains, tighter civil control over nuclear arms, a much more relaxed C2 regime and much safer nuclear arsenals. ([Rajagopalan, 2019](#)) Apart from other benefits, it includes a reduction in risks of accidental escalations or any other sort of nuclear miscalculation, along with it by supporting non-proliferation and in making efforts of disarmament. One can't deny that lack of NFU policy has increased prospects for nuclear fights.

Different analyst's perspectives on the *sole purpose* for NFU, not only attached for deterrence purposes. But if the only purpose of nuclear arms relates it with to deter from other than there is no reason to use such nuclear weapons nor threaten to use them. ([Fetter & Wolfsthal, 2018](#)) A phrase often used by advocates to the continuation of NFU that *such policy has served India well*. Because in nuclear matters, there are no obvious measures or easy ways for its effectiveness, moreover it concerns with assumptions that NFU policy could help in achieving the goal for worldwide demilitarisation. In regards to change, one added to it the paraphrase by Churchill, "so much was done for protection purpose and for securing countless people by the implication of First Use so conceivably a hint to consider.

Any rethinking of existing policy doesn't mean in any way FiU as becomes the default policy, further added to support the argument in a way that to interpret the term in the right way rather than to misinterpret. (Y. Shrikhande, 2020) The doctrine of India hasn't altered and isn't shifting it very soon; nevertheless, their commitment to NFU is more porous than it has ever been before. Modi's second term leads towards more surprising changings as he has shown willingness for taking risks, demonetisation decision, move in Kashmir the recent ones and most importantly, strikes on Pakistan all speak about the tendency. Due to which it raises more concerns over it, that it may not be as sacrosanct as once it might have been getting in many aspects. ([Panda, 2020](#)) By creating doubts in the existing policy, it's enhancing ambiguity and, on the opposite side, deterrence strengthened. But if India switches its policy, it will alert existing nuclear structures in case of change, including the size of delivery and warhead systems will get increase also.

Thus, enabling Pakistan to ask for global intervention in what India is maintaining as their mutual issue needs discussion. ([Menon, 2019](#))

It is pure fantasy to imagine that India can destroy Pakistan nuclear arsenals by initiating the first strike. Moreover, India threatening of pre-emptive strikes will indulge him in the worst of all worlds: unable to carry out its threat but bringing nuclear risks to play early in the crisis. To fritter it away, NFU policy would definitely be extraordinarily unwise because this may go against India's interests, for the reason if it uses its forces against Pakistan, India will try in keeping lessening nuclear risks. Under such circumstances, India would not only give it space to fight but also help to keep away outside powers, and that would pressurise India to end up all hostilities. ([Ramanathan, 2019](#))

### From Gandhist Pacifism to Hindu Nationalism: New Face of India, Polarized Politics

After coming to power, Modi's government, in the context of security policy, set three agendas, namely to resolve border disputes, reforming of defence, strengthening internal security and at last of nuclear strategy. Revision of nuclear doctrine may have been a response to Pakistan TNWs. The danger posed by ruling party BJP shelved it for now, which is noticed by foreign press also researchers about the threat posed to deterrence stability and increasing hard-line nature of Modi party officials. (Foreign and Security Policy under the Modi Government, 2019) Modi second term victory is one of the proofs for his successful foreign policy, and now it is thought to have moved from some shibboleths of the past, i.e. nonalignment and moving posture towards realism and pragmatism, closing strategic partnerships with the USA also tentative partnerships with others like Australia-Japan so that would help in countering China's rise.

Modi's contradictory ideas with old religious Hinduism thought where the superiority of India relies on spirituality rather than on material power. Hindu nationalism has other tendencies which contradict with former vision, later focuses upon desire for material power, in-depth suspicion about

the outside world and a sense of insecurity about Muslims presences in India. Modi, as the leader, pushed to fulfil India's soft-power potential in its foreign affairs policy, and lastly, Modituva as Vishwaguru began reframing India as a leading role at world platform as the conveyor of Vishwaguru so that to take Hindu culture as world guru. (Hall, 2019)

In contrast to Gandhian foreign policy, it is palpable in all that terms what Modi does. Compiling ideas of Gandhi in which he began the campaign, "clean India", and that lesson which Nehru learnt from MK Gandhi, principles of non-belligerent which is irrefutable and that demands new state by getting together. For Gandhi and in his view, we live in interlinked cosmos where violence means self-destructive, and for politics, only one purpose lays behind and, i.e. to erase violence. The solution lays in his own concept of *Satyagraha*, which Nehru took into his foreign policy into practice without hesitation.

After fifteen years, even though Gandhian and Nehru rationale remains but new *economic liberalisation* has now given different impetus in a new form to India's foreign policy, though many accuse Modi of breaking with the past. Now instead of replicating with the logic of MAD termed as Mutually Assured Destruction and on by outdoing challengers through weapons modernisation; thus India became the first country to the comity of nations took seriously the pledge taken on using a nuclear weapon, i.e. their NFU policy. A dangerous game which India is playing is welcoming China and enhancing trade, and to which Europe needs balancing because till day West is bedrock in terms of new technologies. (Godement, 2019)

Hindu Nationalism ideology professed by ruling leader Modi, which affected state foreign policy in many aspects over the last five years of his term; the reason is the rigid nationalist outlook of Modi and his associates, who mainly belongs to RSS (staunch supporters) Hindu nationalist organisation. The impact of such an ideology is though challenging because ideas are an important element and are always a crucial factor in dealing with domestic politics. In taking decisions all, it has connectivity with ideas which pushes the decision-makers to take in accordance with it. One may call

it surgical strikes and airstrikes towards Pakistan all may occur due to Hindu nationalism as one of influencing thought for which cabinet took that step. (Iwanek, 2019)

Shades of ideology were hardly visible towards global powers the China, United States and Russia. Modi efforts for consolidation of its ties with Israel shows intentions of Hind nationalist leaders to forge strong bonds with Israel in preference to build Middle-East Muslim Arab states. 'Money has no nationality, and for nationalists who often proclaims it does, in making foreign investments, the party and RSS Hindu Nationalists together endorsing the idea of *swadeshi* (promotion of own state products & services). Though Modi himself strong supporter of foreign investment in opposition, Modi, along with his party, criticised FDI retail for which they raised their flagship "Make in India", and that in sometimes Modi's cabinet got admonished by RSS for its step of free market-oriented economic policies.

Under Modi, the state of India has increasingly used its religious diplomacy as a strategic tool for achieving goals. Moreover, Modi step for refugees in which complete ban on Muslim refugees as mentioned by Modi, like India the place for persecuted Hindus and they ought to try to find out a refuge for which they are most welcome. The foreign policy of BJP thus took a foreseeable as well as a realistic trajectory. (Iwanek, 2019)

Pakistan rejects Modi war-mongering and irresponsible behaviour remarks as a desperate attempt to divert attention from his cruel doings and global response to his discriminatory actions as *anti-Kashmir and anti-minorities policies* in a straight forward reaction from the foreign office, "remind New Delhi Indian air forces losses" the immediate and effective response. (Syed, 2020) Secular agenda was entwined with Modi roots that strive him to make India only as a state for Hindus; his moderate followers hoped that he might set aside the sectarianism, in regard to rived by dangerous divisions in the country. Over the past few years, Modi's bloc has been spreading the philosophy of us-versus-them in a state which poses serious implications. Now the polling data indicates that when he comes to power, utmost importance will be given to the Hindu agenda first accelerate all over the country.

In modernised India, visions of Hindu nationalists and corresponding anti-Muslim feelings have now coming waves, and that wave of Majoritarianism has hit the higher crest, never ever done it afore. Many party officials in the past denied their accusations that such an act is or might be stoking together aggression and hate. One of the spokespeople, Vinod Bansal for VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parshad), a conservative Hindu nationalist organisation that supports BJP's, expressed that minorities were dominating the majority and politics of India had been geared up to appeasement of state minorities. Moreover, it added that it was becoming problematic for the survival of Hindus. Apart from it, Modi rarely makes overt religiously charged statements against Muslims, unlike his party officials who named Muslims minorities as, Dogs and threatened them to slaughter.

All this shows that Modi has been turning more openly into particularly; such themes of Hindu nationalist since 2014; prominent actors and filmmakers added into the letter things have changed but only to get worst. ([Gettleman et al., 2019](#)) Series of moves by Modi government where the agenda of Hindu nationalism he has been taking to a new level. After the re-election by hurting the Muslim minority population, alarming departures by the Indian government could blur the values-based distinction between Beijing and New Delhi. The new religion base citizenship law of India excludes only Muslim's but fast tracks for other minorities, which seems to be like the step taken for marginalising Muslims in particular.

Another action in the Indian state of Assam where people followed risks of losing their Indian citizenship because of Modi one more step seeks for a national register of citizens for the reason to weed out *illegal migrants*, hinting for Muslims especially. Actions are taken by the government shaken the rule of law in their own country, threatening the secular and inclusive nature of the governmental system. ([Naqvi, 2020](#)) Concessions are not the outcome of Modi's thinking but conform from the very spirit of Mahatma Gandhi's thought, to which Modi just made it happen. In the words of Gandhi, "when-ever our Hindu and Sikh those who are residing in Pakistan if feel they want to come back, they are cordially be welcomed". The point

raised by Gandhi was later on given false colour and incorrectly presented statements by Amit Shah and Modi that *they (Hindus and Sikhs brother and sisters) are qualified to come to India* what our leader said on September 26, 1947, and many other statements which he had never declared. ([Kumar, 2020](#))

Predictions about coming twelve to eighteen months will be critical for India-Pakistan relations; one of three possible forthcoming scenarios as per expectation are the first scenario reveals lesser chances for serious engagements among both countries and that violence remain restricted only to Line of Control (LoC). Second possibility about a prevailing condition that it could further deteriorate in that case if, as the probability of Modi administration, if they continue in adopting harsh policies, particularly towards in isolating Pakistan. Lastly, a bilateral relationship that can further improve certain to some extent includes assembling India's with (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) CPEC, ending of proxy warfare, Pakistan action in removing of extremist outfits and together with accommodation of India-Pakistan strategic interests in Afghanistan. ([Nabeel, 2020](#))

As Government of PM Imran Khan sought a breakthrough in dialogue form in order to resolve diplomatic issues and step for Kartarpur Corridor (sub-national diplomacy), a long-held request made by the Sikh community in India but peace talks got no positive response because of Modi as he refused to do in the making, on the other hand, the crisis of Pulwama and Balakot as BJP cashed domestically in order to secure his next term through rhetoric which they used against Pakistan as *anti-Pakistan* and *decisive leadership*, more or less right to say which helped Modi in securing the second term, to which he responded in the second term by using a slogan that to take them collectively is impossible as *terror and talks cannot go together*. ([Kulkarni, 2019](#)) The utmost pressing threat to India standing on the global stage neither from his rival China's expansionism nor from any deceitful activity of Pakistan but mainly from the politics of their own state, all thus indicates shifting away from passive foreign policy.

The main symptom of a long-term trend of acrimonious polarization in Indian politics is due to



Modi; the world largest democracy has been facing a crisis because of greater realism which India has progressively evolved non-doctrinaire foreign policy vision since it went overtly nuclear. On the one hand, mentioning nuclear-armed status and side by side founding philosophy of non-violence has supposed the rhetorical meaning for an explanation. (Chellaney, 2020) Acrimonious political divisions are new in India as an introduction of a new concept but familiar too in the United States. Every issue seems through the lens of partisan, social media role for further rancorous exchanging's and diverse views on politics have now added into strained relationships. Now under the leadership of Modi, Indian democracy converting into dictatorship; hence research proves about growing polarization in Indian politics. (Masih & AsiaEmail, 2019) Now due to pandemic, Covid-19 struck India; Modi won the re-election through this polarisation of majoritarianism Hindu agenda as assisted by party officials.

Coronavirus turned down political animosities on hold, but despite it, pandemic rapidly amplified the intolerance attitude and societal polarisation against state minorities, of which Muslims are prominent among others. Apart from spreading collective resolve and solidarity towards citizens to support each other at the designated time, but fuelled violence against state Muslims minority which resulted in hashtag protest of *coronajihad*. Pandemic has aggravated religious polarisation, increase in anti-Muslim discrimination and all across the country violence thus painted as "corona-villains". (Sahoo & Sahoo, 2020)

### Indo-Pak Escalation and De-escalation Prospects

The Dog fight war, which was fought in-between Indo-Pak on Kashmir issue on which formerly claimed that later was ready for military attack, though the situation changed after Pulwama crisis. Pakistan will never go for the situation to escalate and never let it to be for it the thing which is important. Even if the chances for conflict appear, an unexpected action could be anticipated from the Indian side, specifically by analysing Modi's bellicose and general *war hysteria* view in society. An escalation would also impact neighbouring state of

Afghanistan, its situation in sum. However, the prospect for escalation in the medium and long run seems to shows possibilities that could be avoided for the part time being. In the next twentieth months, the key subject to discuss would be Kashmir because of the security-related incident that happened in IOK.

The world was on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe after the Pulwama-Kashmir issue. By deliberating on the situation, Pakistani experts present themselves as pessimists about prospects of India de-escalating environment based on the assumption that it would be problematic for Modi in missing opportunity as parliamentary elections about to near. Chaos and disordering of the situation resulting from any sort of India retaliatory strategy have the potential to jeopardise the peace process of neighbouring state of Afghanistan, which the US might not want to solve until the resolution of the quagmire of Afghan.

As China and Saudi Arabia too have stakes in this region, it may possibly never allow in deteriorating SA region stability. As India's Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj gave an interesting opinion that India desires to keep away from additional more escalation and will continue to react responsibly, this is clear that India wouldn't be prudent to escalate until India completes its weapons modernisation. To avoid such issues, Pakistan needs to enhance Foreign Direct investments, so that reduce domestic security concerns. (Hussain, 2019) To learn from *right* past lessons may not bring improvement in making decisions.

States can also draw lessons from the consequences to make them more risk-prone, certainly in comparison to as risk-averse. India has exuded its greater confidence over time and has employed great stridency and risk-taking factor with neighbouring Pakistan. Military modernisation and enhancement of readiness of nuclear weapons and further development for counterforce all present a new posture to lessen the expected cost of conflict. Crisis management growing more complicated as a couple with the involvement of US-China as *de facto* mediators and strategic competition between partners and new alignment also contributed to tightening the situation (P. Lalwani, 2020). In the

region of South Asia, where two states with protracted conflict are negatively causing the main hurdle in the development of the region.

It all based on those past factors and through the lens of those strategies based on established and enforced bilateral rivalry and mistrust yet. Peace for the region is highly elusive and will remain foreseeable in future, but the involvement of internal and external should be needed to take into consideration while discussing for normalising prospects. (Kuszevska, 2020) Modi's nudge diplomacy for the reason to use it as to develop co-operation agenda arguably which means to spread its soft power leverage in the region, Modi more nuanced approach to diplomacy either will extend or not but unclear yet.

Modi policies show no leniency towards Pakistan; in his words, to nudge Afghanistan away from Pakistan influence, he praised Afghan land as the friendly neighbour and reiterating its support for political reconciliation, "Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan controlled".(Prakash, 2019) Political pressures are identified as threats rather than reassurance for which needs educated people from both sides that they should be well known about conflict consequences, and media role is pivotal in this regard in reducing chances for misleading information. So that media can easily do refrain from such inflammatory statements during times of crisis. (Sasikumar, 2019)

## Conclusion

Critiques have discussed much revisiting of nuclear doctrine and in the case about its repercussions for Pakistan as well, but in the elections of 2019, Modi fully skipped the element which he had mentioned in his first term. India would never ever go for this shift towards first use policy for the reason to maintain its image as a responsible state. The strategic logic behind the existing doctrine is much favourable and suits a lot to them in achieving their goals. You don't nuke me; I won't nuke you. Such a logic-based statement shows the decency and responsible posture for which India is maintaining for a long time; in addition, that NFU served India well shows the support of the elite for ND. In the case, if they choose the first use policy, it will definitely raise more serious concerns for India as

well about the affordability of costs and benefits of initiating the first attack. Now the cosmetic change state officials are giving it so that to present that they are still confined to their old desire about revisiting of ND though Modi isn't it shows any interest for its update. But it's true that India has been setting ways in order to achieve goals under the same umbrella of existing doctrine so that it could be able to hold the so-called image of a responsible state on a global platform.

Modi small steps regarding Hindu nationalism which is not mentioned as a component of New Delhi's foreign policy, but the direction reflects Modi's stance concerning its Islamophobia. Hence the Hindu nationalism is taking place and replacing the old concept of pacifism by bringing up new element in their culture. Moreover, there is no more confusion about arms modernisation as the leading authority of extreme Hindutva ideology is taking hold on all matters. In order to isolate Pakistan and demonstrating progression towards a globalised world are creating serious tensions for Pakistan due to the reasons, India has been adopting through the enhancement of relationship with China, Easter Borders, with Israel nuclear deals. To some extent, BJP steps are maybe another way to take revenge on historical events from Pakistan or respond to their capabilities of TNW's, which they are holding now.

In the new dangerous game where India's back is supported by the US, the superpower, while making closer ties with the US, slamming the door to completely shut it down on Pakistan seems to create disastrous tension for Pakistan. However, attempts taken by Modi the discriminatory attitudes towards state citizens, us-vs.-them and other anti-minorities policies along with anti-Kashmir policies are all creating trouble for Indian democracy as well, which has been failing now.. In sum, the Modi regime would never miss the opportunity in regards to conflict with Pakistan. The US, as an Asian power and other stakeholders, didn't make any effort to stop the nuclear arms race, which might go out of their approach when the storm of nuclear taboo will break out. In regards to all, this US role will be crucial as there is a need to stop its support for India specifically; neutrality might bring peace and stability to this region.



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