



Post Withdrawal Situation of us Troops from Afghanistan: Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

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Abstract

The study of international relations has been re-examined in light of a global perspective on politics since the conclusion of World War 2 and the September 11 terrorist attacks. Examining Afghanistan's connection with the SCO is a relatively new subject of study. Between 2001 and 2011, China intervened strategically and economically in Afghanistan in the Bonn talks between Afghanistan, China, and the SCO. Afghanistan was awarded observer status by the SCO in 2012 in order to facilitate the integration of the broader area into the SCO and diminish US-NATO influence in the nation where Russia's key geostrategic interests lay. For China, Afghanistan's natural riches are particularly valuable. Despite the United States' exit from Afghanistan, the Taliban maintains total control of the country, and international governments refuse to recognize them. The country's position is deteriorating due to the government's lack of legitimacy. Both Moscow and Beijing want to put an end to the situation.

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Key Words: Regional Politics, Afghan Issue, Taliban Regime, International Organization

Introduction

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States and its Western allies have dominated the developing world, wielding power via a range of political and economic international institutions. Russia and China have voiced alarm about the US unilateral control of international bodies. In an attempt to contain the rising influence of the United States, China signed the Shanghai Five Agreement in 1996, which comprised delegates from Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. After significant engagement with member nations and the international community, the Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in

2001, which was enlarged to cover the organization's infrastructure. Clubs for Regional Security and Energy. This was done to counteract China's expanding influence in the United States. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization backed the organization's formation in order to counteract the United States' rising influence in the area. If this is the case, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization lacks the resources to engage in direct conflict with the United States. However, in the face of the United States' aggressive actions, China and Russia have been able to preserve a balance of power with their regional allies via the Shanghai

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Cooperation Organization. Examine US actions in the area in relation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Russia-China Coalition, which is the focus of this research study.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a regional organization established in 2001; the main purpose of this organization is to counter International Terrorism, Ethnic Terrorism, and Religious Extremism in member countries. The other objectives of the SCO are to strengthen mutual trust and good neighborly relations between the member countries. Promote effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture, as well as education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, and other fields. Initially, in 2001, when China and Russia partnered with the Central Asian countries, the main purpose of the organization was to focus on the security of the region. Later, China and Russia changed the basic principle of the SCO to restore their credibility in the world. That is why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is currently being used as an organizational tool to balance US policies not only in the region but also outside the region. Other Asian organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are co-founding the Multipolar World, Due to these policies of China and Russia, unilateral policies towards developing countries of the United States are coming to an end. China, through its policies, has further enhanced its relations with Central Asian countries in which has also added considerable strategic partnerships, including the Mega-Free Trade Agreement (Saleem, A., Semitko, H. A., & Zahra, S, 2018).

Furthermore, China and Russia have been effective in cooperating with the anti-Western standards of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Both nations have succeeded in establishing their own norms and regulations in opposition to the West. Through the execution of their policies, both nations are presently succeeding in entirely balancing US policies across the globe. In comparison to the United States, both nations' policies are quite lax. The policies of both nations are Based on non-interference in state affairs, state sovereignty,

political status quo preservation, territorial integrity, and state security. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, the People's Republic of China and Russia took part in large-scale military games organised by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. More than 5,000 soldiers from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan took part in joint planning and operational exercises at the Kazakhstan Metabolk training area, which was organised by the organization's member states, from September 9 to September 25. Both of the market leaders In his 2008 address, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin said, "With the new realities of the nineteenth century, we will observe and participate in the change of global and regional security and development architecture." During the Astana Summit in July 2005, the SCO urged Washington to announce a timeline for withdrawing troops from its member countries, citing the unprecedented deployment of US forces in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The following are the terms used to describe the scenario by a Chinese daily newspaper. "The SCO member states have the potential and obligation to preserve Central Asia's security and to appeal to Western powers to leave the area," was the Summit's most significant signal to the rest of the world. Afghanistan was admitted as an Observer Member in 2012, and previous to that, it was a member of the SCO-Afghanistan Communication Group, which was established in 2005 as a vehicle for the Member States to work on Afghanistan's development and stability. In June 2011, Russia opted to support Afghanistan's bid for observer status, and in October 2011, the Russian ambassador to Kabul announced that Moscow would also assist the country's ambitions to become a member state. Following the Bonn 2001 conference, the SCO issued a unified statement at the Beijing Conference on January 7, 2002, expressing concern over developments in Afghanistan.

Historical background of Study

The vast geopolitical dynamic of Afghanistan's important core region has affected relations between the two countries for decades. The two countries have tried to find ways to benefit from

outside involvement, even at the expense of bilateral relations, particularly in Pashtun-majority border districts. During the colonial period, the attitude of the British Empire toward Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan had a long-lasting impact on the geopolitical role and government structure of both countries. After several unsuccessful Anglo-Afghan wars in the late 1800s, the British began to regard

Afghanistan as a buffer state that alienated Russia and used economic sanctions to push Afghan Emir Abdurrahman to sign the Durand Line Pact. (Thomas Barfield, 2012). The Pukhtoon-majority tribal region functioned as another buffer zone just east of the Durand Line, and after independence in 1947, it remained a semi-autonomous buffer zone



Figure 1: Political Map of Afghanistan

Literature Review

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most interesting, impactful, and surprising geopolitical developments has been the increasing bilateral relations between China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow, formerly arch-rivals, are now working together on military concerns, cyber security, high technology, and other space-related issues. While this is less than an alliance, the deepening of the Sino-Russian collaboration has the potential to disrupt US strategies in the region. On the basis of the two countries' common policy positions in the region, the United States is rearranging its policies in the region, including withdrawing its troops from

Afghanistan and withdrawing from its nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018 and now rejoining that agreements in a new form (Saleem, A., Semitko, H. A., & Zahra, S, 2018). This is the motivating factor behind the unification of China and Russia. China and Russia avoided pursuing mutual interests and undermining one other immediately after the following the United States' exit from Afghanistan last year. Both the bilateral and SCO have conducted military exercises with Central Asian partners. Russia is deepening its economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan, while China continues to be a key factor driving the growth of CPEC, which is an essential part of the BRI.

Despite recent cooperation in the region, Chinese and Russian goals in Central and South Asia are not the same. China wants to economically integrate these territories into the Belt and Road Initiative while also exposing Indian influence and combating security challenges in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. Russia, on the other hand, places a high value on India in its foreign policy and gives it a separate status in comparison to Pakistan. In contrast, Russia aims to maintain its role as the primary security provider, which it views as a major Eurasian region and seeks to balance its long-standing relations with India with Pakistan in a new way. On a wide range of security issues, such as concerns about the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking threats from Afghanistan, China and Russia hold similar stances, although they disagree on certain major regional matters, most notably India's role in central security and The mechanism for delivering in Asia, as well as the Taliban's true identity.

At first glance, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan seems to start opening opportunities for cooperation. China wants to work with Russia on Afghanistan and wants the two countries to be on an equal footing in any situation that emerges. On September 16, China's State Minister Weng Yue told his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov that China is willing to further enhance collaboration with Russia in order to cooperatively handle the Afghan crisis. Lavrov stated that he will collaborate with China in Afghanistan to "coordinate joint changes."[\(Wishnick, E, 2021\).](#)

China and Russia celebrated the 20th anniversary of their friendship, good neighbor, and cooperation pact in July 2001, just before the fall of the Afghan government. The two neighbors have declared that they have developed a detailed strategic strategy since 2019. In the Chinese lexicon, Coordination Partnership for the New Era is defined as Strategic Partnership. In Afghanistan, China and Russia blame the US for the problems that have arisen and the current chaos, and they reject US actions that would hold the Taliban accountable for human rights violations. In fact, Beijing and Moscow voted against the UN's appointment of a human rights correspondent for Afghanistan.

They've also taken some additional efforts in Central Asia as members of the SCO to expand their individual security cooperation with Central Asian countries. In Afghanistan, China and Russia blame the US for the problems that have arisen and the current chaos, and they reject US actions that would hold the Taliban accountable for human rights violations. In fact, Beijing and Moscow voted against the UN's appointment of a human rights correspondent for Afghanistan. They've also taken some additional efforts in Central Asia as members of the SCO to expand their individual security cooperation with Central Asian countries (Zehra, S. 2018). Despite the fact that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are not the main stakeholders in the region at the present, they hold frequent diplomatic meetings, provide political assistance, and encourage the Afghan peace process. There is a lot to improve. As a result of the peace in Afghanistan, they have their own economic interests. While Central Asian states often express concerns about the spread of extremism from Afghanistan to their countries, they also acknowledge that if home-grown extremism tarnishes their international reputation, especially when reports start to appear that Asian citizens are fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The current situation in Afghanistan has heightened concern among SCO member states, strengthening their common interests in regional coordination, system stability, and economic cooperation.

With population growth, rising inflation, and a deteriorating environment in SCO member states, more economic and social problems are likely to emerge, causing unrest and instability. And it will cause havoc on regional stability. The SCO's basic mission of combating shared threats of terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism remains essential in this regard; economic cooperation has progressively evolved into a method of supporting the mission and a new important objective. While enormous economic cooperation is meant to help ensure regional stability, and how the idea advocated by China may be further promoted as an indicator of SCO adaptation and vitality. Internal disagreements have developed in recent years as the SCO has expanded. China appears to be willing to allow

Mongolia and Turkmenistan, but no one is enthusiastic about the prospect, and the country is not prepared to abandon its neutrality later. Concerns have been raised about the situation in Afghanistan by India, Pakistan, and Iran, among other countries. However, Chinese leaders are concerned about regional conflicts with current members of those organizations, particularly those between India and Pakistan, which assume that their entry into the SCO will bring the conflict to a close because of their alliance and operational efficiency in the region. Nonetheless, it appears that the common cause of Afghanistan, Western pressure on Russia and China, and the necessity to combat terrorism have all contributed to the resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan. China's interest in SCO is to enhance China's influence and maintain stability in Central Asia. Working through SCOs is more effective than working through bilateral relations with individual countries.[\(Ali et al., 2019\)](#)

Research Methodology

A critical and contextual study has been done. The sources used for this research are mainly from handwritten documents including newspapers, magazines, reports and archives.

Research Objective

The prime purpose of the study is to examine the Afghan issue in light of SCO contribution. The study of international relations has been re-examined in light of a global perspective on politics since the conclusion of World War II and the September 11 terrorist attacks. Examining and comprehending Afghanistan's connection with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a relatively new subject of study. Between 2001 and 2011, China intervened strategically and economically in Afghanistan in the Bonn talks between Afghanistan, China, and the SCO. Afghanistan was awarded observer status by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2012 in order to facilitate the integration of the broader area into the SCO and diminish US-NATO influence in the nation where Russia's key geostrategic interests lay. China, which has nothing to lose by joining the SCO.

Discussion

The SCO's Geopolitical Positioning

Even in terms of measuring diplomatic and economic capacity, the SCO actively emphasizes the diversity of its membership in terms of their varying political, cultures, geographic locations, and economic systems. [\(President et al., 2004\)](#) In recognition of this diversity, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) asserts that it represents a new concept of comprehensive regional cooperation, capable of involving all of its members, who are sometimes referred to as "Shanghai spirits." Indeed, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has played a clear, but extremely significant role as a mechanism to enhance and regulate cooperation among its member states, as well as a mechanism for establishing stronger confidence from the outset. To put it another way, but their skill and competence in handling with some of these conflicts in the real world have been questioned. The most essential relationship among SCO members is the organization's long-term stability and effectiveness, as well as relations with Russian China. The SCO has grown in lockstep with the development of Russian-Chinese relations during the previous two decades. The SCO, in the perspective of the Central Asian Republics, is a unique platform in which they may interact with two regional powers at once. Both Russia and China are there as a good dynamic to ensure that the agenda is not dominated by a single powerful external sponsor. It has been argued that Central Asian leaders have greater options to pursue their own interests within the SCO, whether or not they include Russia or only China, within their own framework.[\(President et al., 2004\)](#)

Concerns over water resources are another source of contention. The largest supplies of water in the arid Central Asian region come from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's mountainous regions, and flow through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan's rivers. A lack of alternative natural resources for generating energy forces upstream states to concentrate on the construction of dams for hydroelectric power generation instead. In many cases, this is in direct contradiction with the interests of the lower

states, which depend on a strong water flow for crop irrigation, particularly cotton, which is a major source of national wealth in the country. In this case, the issue is mostly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Currently, the Dushanbe-Rogun Dam is attempting to move the project forward, and Tashkent has responded by cutting off gas supplies to Tajikistan's industries. The SCO will have to play a key role in resolving the issue between its Central Asian members so that the organization's overall function is not damaged.

The SCO is an Ideal Platform for Resolving the Afghanistan Crisis

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may be a suitable platform for resolving Afghanistan's problems. All of its neighbors, with the exception of Turkmenistan, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), either as full members (China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan) or as observer states (Iran). Because many SCO members have unsecure borders with Afghanistan, the situation in a war-torn country has a direct impact on the domestic stability of those countries that have them. In 2005, a 'SCO-

Afghanistan Communication Group' (Shanghe zuzhi - Afghan lianluo zu) was established, indicating Afghanistan's growing importance to the organization. More information on the activity of the contact group is not available, as is typical with SCO activities, and it was not much attended until its 'recovery' in 2017. In Moscow, he had planned a special meeting on Afghanistan. Participants endorsed the 'SCO and Afghanistan action plan on countering terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime' in March 2009. The action plan aims on member states to invite key Afghan institutions to engage in joint exercises, seminars, and training courses. In the future, the participants agreed to build a Regional Anti-Drug Center and a Specialized SCO Training Center. Aside from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation, SCO member nations have become increasingly active in Afghanistan's rebuilding and political instability following the withdrawal of US forces. According to a standard letter in several SCO publications about Afghanistan, China believes that terrorism and extremism can only be eradicated if deep social and economic issues are addressed. (Seiwert, E., 2021)



Figure 2: SCO Meeting on Afghan Issue

However, it is unclear what the SCO is doing as a group. Rashid Aliimov, the then-SCO Secretary-General, said during a meeting on the Afghanistan issue in October 2016 that SCO member nations help with "creating national defense and law enforcement institutions,

recovering the economy, and transport networks." For example, China established the China-Afghanistan Air Corridor, Afghan economists and engineers were trained at Kazakh universities, and Afghan army cadets were trained in Moscow.

After the Taliban took control of Kabul, the first SCO member meeting was held at [Dushanbe on 17th September 2021](#). There are no new measures for dealing with the Afghan problem announced in conjunction with the SCO's 20th anniversary celebration. According to member states, the only other option for resolving conflicts across the world is through political and diplomatic means, in accordance with universally accepted standards and principles of international law. Afghanistan's immediate solution is seen as the most significant aspect in securing and enhancing peace and stability in the SCO's region by member states. They are in favor of an Afghanistan free of terrorism, war, and narcotics that is neutral, united, democratic, and peaceful. Member States agree that Afghanistan needs a multi-party government that includes representatives from all ethnic, religious, and political groupings in the country. The SCO member states highlight the importance of regional and neighboring countries' long-term hospitality and effective assistance to Afghan refugees, emphasizing the importance for the international community to be respectful of their own country and make an active effort to facilitate a safe and sustainable return.

Moscow's Security Strategy for Afghanistan

The presence of US troops in Afghanistan demonstrates that Moscow's military commitment to Afghanistan has remained consistent throughout time. Throughout the Soviet Union's existence and since its collapse, Russia has maintained a military presence in Central Asian "frontline" republics, particularly Tajikistan, to protect its interests. He has a direct line of communication with the various warring factions in Afghanistan. Furthermore, limited diplomatic efforts ensured that both were made easier. All three of these tactics serve as a basis for Russia's 'containment policy' in Afghanistan, which is described below.

1. In order to maintain Russia's own security, which is based on 'instability' originating in Afghanistan.

2. Make sure that Russia has a presence in Central Asia.
3. Russia supports in the promotion of diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan

The first of these measures, border guarding, is the most widely used and has been in effect since 1989, and it is a clear continuation of that strategy. In actuality, the Soviet departure from Afghanistan in 1989 did not give Moscow the choice of defining its border with Afghanistan. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation assumed command of a number of former Soviet troops. Russia (enthusiastically) positioned them as "frontline" republics such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan's border defences. Recent developments in Afghanistan have given Moscow's border security measures new energy. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have allegedly increased security cooperation with Russia along their borders with Afghanistan. While there is no evidence that a Russian crew is patrolling its borders, it has been said that it is cooperating in the sharing of consultants and border security information. Tajikistan has sought help from its Collective Security Treaty Organization members (CSTO). The format of this assistance has yet to be determined. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Russia's Tajik base was ready to help in the event of an Afghan invasion.

"We will do everything, including using the capabilities of the Russian military base on the border of Tajikistan with Afghanistan, in order to prevent any aggressive inclinations against our allies," Lavrov said. (TACC, 2021)

The second component is involvement with Afghan parties on the ground. Najibullah was a key negotiator for Moscow from 1989 to 1991, the Kabul government from 1992 to 1994, and the Northern Alliance's anti-Taliban alliance after 1995. Parallel to these engagements, a conversation with other warring groups in the goal of establishing a peace process took place.

Specialized diplomatic activities, such as operational diplomacy, have been made available to help with border security and engagement. Border Protection - As an ever-changing dynamic relationship with frontline

nations. For example, when ties between Ashgabat and Moscow deteriorated in the late 1990s, military cooperation worsened as well, with border troops incurring a casualty.

In the late 1990s, Iran, India, and Russia collaborated to provide armaments to the anti-Taliban alliance. Since 2001, the US and NATO have largely absorbed Moscow's interest in Afghanistan, with the SCO and China playing a growing role. Russia's short interactions with the United States in Afghanistan in the early 2000s may be considered not just as a watershed moment in US-Russian relations, but also as another diplomatic engagement in Moscow's containment policy. That is, the United States and Russia forged a cooperation to assist the parties - the "Northern Alliance" and the Kabul government - until 2010.

China is expected to play a larger role for the first time since the 1980s. For decades, Beijing has maintained connections with the Taliban, pushing Chinese firms to do the same. The expanding Chinese diplomatic, economic, and security presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan is extending the Asian dimension of Sino-Russian relations, opening up new avenues for cooperation as well as misperception of one another. The Russian approach in Afghanistan helps us better comprehend Moscow's goals.

A Strategic Analysis of Afghanistan by China

With the withdrawal of the US military, Afghanistan's future appears to be less certain than it was previously. How does China assess and plan for the future of Afghanistan, a neighboring country with significant national interests?

China has been wary of the US military presence in Afghanistan since 9/11. On the one hand, Beijing rightfully regards US soldiers stationed in its "backyard" as a severe strategic danger. China, on the other hand, thinks that US security has aided it, notably in terms of the establishment and spread of anti-China terrorist organisations. This conundrum implies that China wants the US to leave, but only if the leaving is responsible and the zone is not destabilised by a chaotic power vacuum.

However, the US decision on Afghanistan will be made in Washington, not Beijing, and China will be obligated to respond to whatever actions the US takes.

Both the US and the Taliban have made official statements about the signing of the Doha peace agreement on February 29, 2020. Instead, China anticipates that the US-mediated agreement will exacerbate regional instability, prompting the region to seek multilateral alternatives to avoid collapse, such as UN peacekeeping missions. China's main aim in Afghanistan is stability. According to Beijing, the turmoil in Afghanistan undermines Islamic fundamentalism, endangering China's domestic security, particularly in Xinjiang. If anything, China is not a moderating influence in Afghanistan. China's general theory of the US involvement in Afghanistan is a jumble of contradictory elements. China, on the other hand, is aiming for the US as it establishes a presence in the heart of the Eurasian continent that can be used to exert control over China. Beijing regards the US's continued confrontation with the Taliban as "irresponsible," as it is destabilising the country and rattling the region. From a Chinese perspective, 9/11 and the subsequent Afghan war fueled Muslim fundamentalism in the region, directly contributing to unrest in China's Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous province. Given the superpowers, China would prefer domestic stability and a functioning government in Afghanistan, which is not preferable to a neutral government but preferable to a neutral one between major powers. After observing the swamp in which Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States were rooted, China has always considered Afghanistan to be a "graveyard of empires." Beijing has always felt that if at all possible, serious uncertainty in Afghan affairs should be avoided. Afghan investment opportunities were quickly extinguished as security conditions deteriorated, and major projects had to be halted. China's investment in Afghanistan remains minimal, with only \$2.2 million invested in 2016 and \$400 million in total equity investments by the end of 2017. Despite an official declaration recognising Afghanistan as a critical link in the "Belt and Road" initiative. ([SUN.Y., April 8, 2020](#))

The deep economic ties that exist between Beijing and Kabul are driven mostly by security considerations. With the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, the security situation has deteriorated. The Chinese people are well-informed and concerned about the country's prospects for security recovery and increased violence as long as the Afghan peace process is in place. If the United States withdraws completely from Afghanistan, China will have to invest more heavily in its stability efforts, including development assistance, diplomacy, capacity building, military assistance, and intervention. The Chinese government, on the other hand, is sceptical that the US will abandon its presence and influence in Afghanistan, given the country's critical geopolitical position and the enormous value that the US has amassed since 2001.

According to China, the US has withdrawn from Afghanistan in an irresponsible manner. As a result, the US will provide dirt for Afghans and other countries in the region, especially if Washington faces the prospect of drastically reducing funding to Afghanistan and other countries. The US-Taliban peace treaty, as well as the US's "shameful" withdrawal from Vietnam, were dubbed "shameful" by state-owned Chinese media in the 1970s.

Afghanistan Security in Perspective of Pakistan

Efforts to end the Afghan conflict have focused on the interests of the three parties engaged – the Afghan government, the Taliban, and the US – rather than the Afghan people. All three are personally engaged in the matter and have been involved in its investigation, prosecution, and ultimate resolution from its inception. Afghanistan's eastern border is being contested by a number of entities, the fourth of which is Pakistan, which has played a critical role in resolving the situation. Former US President Donald Trump allegedly asked Pakistan for help in bringing the Taliban to the table in 2018, and when intra-Afghan talks started more than two years later, he praised Pakistan's cooperation in "advancing the Afghan peace process." ([Threlkeld and colleagues, 2021](#)).

Since the colonial era, five similar themes have emerged in the combined history of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sovereignty, security concerns, and geopolitical forces have all prevented relations between the two nations from moving beyond a condition of frigid tolerance marked by distrust. The other two, cross-border links and contacts, as well as commerce, show potential for improving bilateral ties.

Concerns about Sovereignty

Afghanistan and Pakistan both have a fragile temperament. He also understands the weariness that comes with living with autism. Islamabad is very worried by Kabul's unwillingness to recognise the Durand Line as an international boundary and its colonial-era access to Pakistani Pashtuns. Pashtun separatist support in Afghanistan dates back to the founding of Pakistan in 1947 and has subsequently faded. ([Threlkeld and colleagues, 2021](#)).

In the early years of Pakistan's independence, Kabul backed Pakistani politicians in Pashtunistan. Its initial reluctance to recognise Pakistan in the US has raised worries about the new state's sovereignty. Despite the present condition of relations, interviewees suggested that talks on delicate matters like as self-determination, particularly the Durand Line, may restart. As a consequence of a sense of self-infringement violations on both sides of the Durand Line, policy measures that support persons who are most negatively affected by the assumption of mutual risk - as well as their respective communities - may be enacted.

Security Interests

Given its regional adversaries and its neighbouring India, Pakistan places all of its security interests on Afghanistan. According to the New York Times, Islamabad has advocated for a siege scenario in which India's power stretches from Pakistan's eastern to western frontiers.

The formation of a "strategic dip" in Afghanistan via the pursuit of friendly administrations in Kabul while limiting New

Delhi's participation in the nation (S. Nawaz, 2008).

Afghanistan holds Pakistan accountable for the country's bloodshed over the previous several decades as a result of its proxy actions. In return, Pakistan accuses Afghanistan and India of assisting in strikes on its western border. The Afghan-backed Pashtuns attacked Pakistan's security worries after independence, but the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 posed an even larger danger. The Soviet Union, India's staunch ally, stationed hostile soldiers on Pakistan's western border and endangered Pakistani sovereignty. As a result of these concerns, the US and Saudi-backed proxy operation in Pakistan was created, which delivered billions of dollars in assistance, weapons, and training to the mujahedeen through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). S.Coll (2004)

Islamabad donated the bulk of the funding to extremist organisations in Afghanistan thought to be Pakistani supporters. Kabul has assured Pakistan that he would not intervene with the Durand Line, allowing Pakistan to deploy its troops more freely in the continuing combat. According to one respondent, Afghan authorities have lately been more sensitive to Pakistan's fears over Indian intervention, and have even pushed to engage New Delhi in the conversation.

Conclusion

Aside from the Taliban-US peace deal in Afghanistan, China sees its role as cautious and adaptable. China views its role in Afghan security in three ways. First, it is not a major player in the conflict. China is unquestionably a major power and a neighbouring country that should not be overlooked. Furthermore, Chinese investment will be critical to the country's post-conflict development and economic growth. Since the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have a long way to go before they can improve their cooperation with Afghanistan and overcome the situation there. Of

international funding that will be useful in dealing with a massive human disaster in the future. Delaying acceptance of Taliban control by governments around the world may have a negative impact on regional countries. It can also travel to Russia, China, and Pakistan.

If the situation in Afghanistan worsens, states in the region that contribute to Afghan stability, such as Iran, Russia, China, and the Gulf States, will be required to increase their engagement. Despite growing competition between major countries and their regional partners, third parties have remained relatively united in their support for the Doha process's political solution negotiations. It is possible that parallel or competing diplomatic paths will be exposed, complicating dynamic diplomatic operations, increasing the likelihood of instability in Afghanistan, and decreasing the incentive for Afghan involvement in Afghanistan. Local power brokers and Taliban leaders, as well as Afghan elites and Taliban leaders, have the ability to disrupt the negotiation process and encourage greater repatriation.

If the violence in Afghanistan continues to escalate, regional third parties such as the SCO will need to become more involved, both militarily and financially. They must consider the large number of Afghan refugees as well as the possibility of terrorists operating in the country. The competition between major powers, particularly the United States and SCO member countries, is a critical factor that can affect both the Afghan peace process and relations between Afghan and regional states. Because their security interests in Afghanistan are mostly aligned, the parties' widespread animosity does not impede their efforts to find a political solution to the country's political problems. The US and China have both been participating in talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Because China, the United States, and Russia support negotiations in the first scenario but respond differently in the second and third scenarios, the dynamics in Afghanistan may potentially drive a repeat in regional attitudes.

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