

p-ISSN : 2788-502X | e-ISSN : 2788-4678

DOI(Journal): 10.31703/gfpr

DOI(Volume): 10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII)

DOI(Issue): 10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II)

www.gfprjournal.com



GFPR
GLOBAL FOREIGN
POLICIES REVIEW

GFPR

GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICIES REVIEW



VOL. VII, ISSUE, II, Spring (JUNE-2024)

Humanity Publications
Sharing Research
www.humanpub.com
US | UK | Pakistan

Double-blind Peer-review Research Journal

www.gfprjournal.com

© Global Foreign Policies Review

Article Title

Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions

Global Foreign Policies Review

p-ISSN: 2788-502x e-ISSN: 2788-5038

DOI(journal):10.31703/gfpr

Volume: VII (2024)

DOI (volume):10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII)

Issue: II Spring (June-2024)

DOI(Issue): 10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II)

Home Page

www.gfprjournal.com

Volume: IX (2024)

<https://www.gfprjournal.com/Current-issues>

Issue: II-Spring (June-2024)

<https://www.gfprjournal.com/Current-issues/7/2/2024>

Scope

<https://www.gfprjournal.com/about-us/scope>

Submission

<https://humaglobe.com/index.php/gfpr/submissions>

Google Scholar



Visit Us



Abstract

This paper extrapolates the extent to which political psychology, with special reference to cognitive biases and motivated reasoning, transforms the foreign policy decision makers' ability to signal resolution during international crises. Based on the theoretical contributions from Jervis, Kahneman, and Mercer, the paper investigates how various psychological factors, such as the emotional association with prior beliefs and distortions such as overconfidence, can have a strong influence on communication between adversaries. By making use of a qualitative and interpretive framework, the paper develops strong psychological insights into the theories of international relations by making a strong challenge to the premises of the rationalist bargaining model. The paper concludes by analyzing the limitations of rationalist models and the utmost need to integrate psychological variables into the study of strategic communication.

Keywords: Political Psychology, Cognitive Bias, Motivated Reasoning, Foreign Policy, Rationalist Bargaining Model, Crisis Signaling

Authors:

Muhammad Dawood Khan: (Corresponding Author)

Graduate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom.

(Email: muhammaddawoodkhan64@gmail.com)

Pages: 1-6

DOI: 10.31703/gfpr.2024(IX-II).01

DOI link: [https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024\(VII-II\).01](https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01)

Article link: <http://www.gfprjournal.com/article/cognitive-bias-and-crisis-signaling-the-psychological-drivers-of-foreign-policy-decisions>

Full-text Link: <https://gfprjournal.com/fulltext/cognitive-bias-and-crisis-signaling-the-psychological-drivers-of-foreign-policy-decisions>

Pdf link: <https://www.gfprjournal.com/jadmin/Author/31rv1olA2.pdf>

Citing this Article

01	Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions						
Pages	1-6	Author	Muhammad Dawood Khan	DOI	10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01		
	Year	2024	Volume	VII	Issue	II	
Referencing & Citing Styles	APA	Khan, M. D. (2024). Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions. <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> , VII(II), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01					
	CHICAGO	Khan, Muhammad Dawood. 2024. "Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions." <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> VII (II):1-6. doi: 10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01.					
	HARVARD	KHAN, M. D. 2024. Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions. <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> , VII, 1-6.					
	MHRA	Khan, Muhammad Dawood. 2024. 'Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions', <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> , VII: 1-6.					
	MLA	Khan, Muhammad Dawood. "Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions." <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> VII.II (2024): 1-6. Print.					
	OXFORD	Khan, Muhammad Dawood (2024), 'Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions', <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> , VII (II), 1-6.					
TURABIAN	Khan, Muhammad Dawood. "Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions." <i>Global Foreign Policies Review</i> VII, no. II (2024): 1-6. https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01 .						





Global Foreign Policies Review

www.gfprjournal.com

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr>



Pages: 1-6

URL: [https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024\(VII-II\).01](https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01)

Doi: 10.31703/gfpr.2024(VII-II).01



Cite Us



Title

Cognitive Bias and Crisis Signaling: The Psychological Drivers of Foreign Policy Decisions

Abstract

This paper extrapolates the extent to which political psychology, with special reference to cognitive biases and motivated reasoning, transforms the foreign policy decision makers' ability to signal resolution during international crises. Based on the theoretical contributions from Jervis, Kahneman, and Mercer, the paper investigates how various psychological factors, such as the emotional association with prior beliefs and distortions such as overconfidence, can have a strong influence on communication between adversaries. By making use of a qualitative and interpretive framework, the paper develops strong psychological insights into the theories of international relations by making a strong challenge to the premises of the rationalist bargaining model. The paper concludes by analyzing the limitations of rationalist models and the utmost need to integrate psychological variables into the study of strategic communication.

Authors:

Muhammad Dawood Khan: (Corresponding Author)

Graduate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom.

(Email: muhammaddawoodkhan64@gmail.com)

Contents

- [Introduction](#)
- [Introduction](#)
- [Theoretical Framework](#)
- [Research Methodology](#)
- [The Psychological Roots of Misperception in Crisis Signaling](#)
- [Regime Perception and Motivated Reasoning in Crisis Decision-Making](#)
- [Misperception and Hawkish Bias: Psychological Dynamics in Crisis Diplomacy](#)
- [The Illusion of Strength: Psychological Biases in Crisis Diplomacy and Conflict Escalation](#)
- [Psychological Biases in Crisis Decision-Making: Overconfidence and Competition Neglect](#)
- [Overconfidence and the Escalation of the Security Dilemma](#)
- [Signaling Resolution: The Rationalist Approach and Its Limitations](#)
- [Conclusion](#)
- [References](#)

Keywords: [Political Psychology](#), [Cognitive Bias](#), [Motivated Reasoning](#), [Foreign Policy](#), [Rationalist Bargaining Model](#), [Crisis Signaling](#)

Introduction

When discussing the role played by political psychology in international relations of a state and the impact it plays on the process of decision making, there is a significant question: to what extent does political psychology (cognitive bias and motivated reasoning) influence a foreign policy decision maker's ability to signal resolution in crises? The formation of belief systems and the processing of information that takes place for any statesman can be significantly crucial in the international

relations of a state. One must note the fact that the scholarship of international relations has largely derived psychological models as a reaction to the rational decision-making model. While discussing how essentially cognitive or motivated bias of decision makers shapes the foreign policy of any state, it is pertinent to understand how the rational decision-making model works. It would allow us to develop a strong comparative that can help us to solve the puzzle this paper is looking to extrapolate (Lebow, 1981).

This work is licensed under the Attribution-Noncommercial- No Derivatives 4.0 International.



The traditional perspective of rational decision making revolves around the fact that the actions taken by all the actors are basically outcomes of the efforts made to maximize the value in a restricted setup where boundaries are set and strides to maximize the value are to be ensured. This premise puts a strong threshold for the choices and the synthesis of information that is provided to policy makers to reach a conclusion on any issue (Janis & Mann, 1977). In this scenario, all the stakeholders can realize any conflicting situation to their own interests and can henceforth make tradeoffs. All the actions that are taken by the statesman are focused on the short- or long-term benefit for the state, and it is assumed that the actors involved in the process have the capacity to make decisions based on the calculus of understanding the need to make critical decisions based on this metric (Kertzer & Tingley, 2018).

The rational decision-making model largely revolves around the tenets of identifying and ranking the goals that are supposed to be a result of a synthesis of information gathering and the cementing of the goals that are crucially important for a state. Scholars also argue that the rational actors that are involved in foreign policy making when the situation requires signaling resolution in any crisis, must have the ability to rationally justify the decisions that are made in coherence with the 'laws of probability'. Furthermore, the most important aspect of rational decision making is the fact that most of the decisions that an actor is taking might be a part of more successive decisions (Elster, 1990).

Theoretical Framework

As the paper discusses the aspects of rational decision-making that have been popular in the field of political science, most theorization of political ideas is dependent upon such a mechanism. It becomes necessary to understand that the incorporation of political psychology in interpreting how decision makers take steps in a crisis to signal resolution is based on the individual decision maker's own cognitive understanding, at most times, which is ignored by most rationalists. Scholars argue that the conception of achieving the ideals of rationality is almost impossible to achieve in the international system, and the approximation of such stringent values is almost impossible to achieve (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

The conception of "bounded rationality" in this regard provides a very reasonable explanation by highlighting the importance of an individual in the decision-making process. It posits that the ability of individuals to act rationally is significantly marred by the complexity of the intelligence that is provided, which is overshadowed by the conflictual interests and insecurity (Yarhi-Milo, 2018). The informational boom that a decision maker has to undergo in a crisis forces them to take a shortcut towards simplified mechanisms that

require little to no cognitive effort. This gives birth to the retortion towards already present agendas, and this leads to results towards tense situations in consistency with the historical tendencies that the state had always had in the past (March 1958). Further analysis around the same argument reveals the fact that the wiring of the human brain is rigid and has the capacity to function regardless of the individual's sentiments. The shortcuts that the brain opts for in crisis situations are necessary for the functioning of an individual to make logical decisions in normal life, but they give birth to cognitive biases, which can overshadow decision-making in times of crisis.

The debate on the influence of cognitive bias on the signaling of decision makers cannot be completed without mentioning the ideas of Jervis on the subject matter. Jervis argues that cognitive biases give birth to misperceptions and war in international relations by sending wrong signals to enemies in times of crisis. Scholars further elaborate that cognitive biases in times of crisis can give rise to "hawkish" propensities among states and can reasonably promote confusion, suspicion, and further hostility in times of crisis. Jervis in the very same context argues that these cognitive biases can either lead to overestimation of any situation and send false signals to enemies while on the other hand in some cases the bias can also lead to underestimation of the threats by giving a sense of security which mainly comes from overlooking the motives of the enemy which can be linked to stark intelligence disasters. Such that in a scenario where the assessment of threat is precise and can prepare a state to counter an attack from an enemy, on the other hand, undervaluing the dangers can lead to the birth of a conflict (Jervis, 2017).

Research Methodology

This research makes use of a qualitative, theory-inspired approach, which has its foundations in political psychology and international relations, aiming to interpret how cognitive biases and motivated reasoning impact foreign policy decision makers' ability to signal resolution in times of crisis. The methodology is developed in the form that it has its foundations in interpretivist epistemology by creating a strong focus on the extent to which subjective psychological processes, for instance, the fundamental attribution error, illusion of control, and over-confidence, shift the perception and strategic signaling. Based on the works of prominent international relations scholars such as Jervis, Kahneman, Mercer, and Fearon, the paper establishes a nuanced synthesis through which psychological misrepresentations can influence trustworthy communication in international crises.

From an empirical perspective, the paper makes use of the comparative case study method, integrating influential crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis and other relevant examples widely discussed in the political psychology literature. The main focus of this research

methodology is to incorporate the fact that decision makers' perceptions, whether negative or positive, make an impact on the security dilemma. These cases are analyzed by making use of the mechanism of process tracing to identify the necessary causal pathways between the psychological mechanisms and the result of crisis signaling. The secondary sources that are used in this paper include peer-reviewed journals and declassified primary sources that are used to make a strong analysis. Furthermore, the study makes use of rationalist bargaining theory to analyze the gap between war and signaling failures. The comprehensive approach in this paper makes use of broader literature to develop a nuanced understanding of the issue.

The Psychological Roots of Misperception in Crisis Signaling

However, the crucially significant aspect of cognitive bias is the impact that old beliefs and thoughts have on the decision maker's ability to comprehend and understand the information that is received in times of crisis. Individuals tend to shape their thought processes in such a way that it benefits their own emotions. The tendency to follow repetition of information that is suitable for their own benefit and prior beliefs is commonplace. The cognitive anchoring of previous beliefs of an individual can shape the information coming from the battleground in an entirely different manner and can henceforth appear as entirely different from what the reality of the situation demands (Jervis, 2017).

In fact, the immensely critical impact of cognitive bias is the "fundamental attribution error" proposed by Nisbett and Ross, which argues that individuals have the tendency to elaborate the actions of others with hostility, ignoring the gravity of the situation. This misappropriation of actions can thus lead to such a point where the hostile action might appear defensive to an entirely different cause (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This is where the security dilemma takes birth by interpreting the ideological foundations of the actions taken by other states in a fundamental attribution error, where signaling is entirely misinterpreted, and war is inevitable. Also, individuals have the highest regard for their own actions by arguing that their own actions in any crisis are purely defensive, and interestingly, it is perceived that the enemy has comprehension of the fact that these actions are supposed to be defensive. The birth of an aggressive spiral that takes place in such a crisis situation is a result of negative signaling and the taking over of a strong security dilemma (Mercer, 2010).

Regime Perception and Motivated Reasoning in Crisis Decision-Making

Also, an important contribution of Jervis in this argument This is the extension that he provides for the assessment of the political regime of an opponent. The general

perception by decision makers of another state is largely embedded in the process of analyzing the regime of an opponent as sufficiently centralized. Although the overestimation of this belief ignores the fact that the internal restriction on the decision maker's actions is hindering the process of decision making. Such that some states resort to taking such actions, which can be quite adamant and reflect hostile intentions to the opponents, but they might be the result of internal pressure (Levy, 1994).

The paper would now focus on how motivated reasoning shapes a decision maker's action in an attempt to signal resolution in a crisis. There is a clear distinction between cognitive bias and motivated reasoning, which stems from the ability of individuals to reason against the sets of beliefs and ideals that they have strong alignment with. Individuals have an inherent sentimental connection towards confronting the reality of some scenario that hinders their progress towards a certain achievement or target.

Cognitive dissonance is the foundational aspect of motivated bias or reasoning, which elaborates the fact that the perception of individuals regarding the world is essentially a product of a rationalization process that meets the convenience of any individual. The intensity of motivated reasoning can be highlighted by taking into account the trade-offs that the states have to make in a situation where any hard decision has to be made, which goes against their agenda. Amongst the most popular beliefs among scholars as to how leaders follow motivated reasoning, the most prominent aspect comes from the partisan characteristics inhibited by the decision makers. The leadership of any state can have various expectations with regard to the outcome of any specific situation, and they might have the tendency to distort the information to their benefit (Kaufman, 2004).

Misperception and Hawkish Bias: Psychological Dynamics in Crisis Diplomacy

Now focusing on how political psychological perspectives can influence the decision-making of the states in crisis situations to signal resolution. Such that this school of thought highlights the problem with the rationalist theories that the signaling from adversaries can be lost in the process of translating it and making its true meaning beyond the borders. Take this explanation, for instance, that misperception on both sides of the border can lead towards war but recent explanations of cold war also bring us to an understanding that mutual misperception can actually generate prolonged sustenance of cooperation among certain states that can help to elevate the conflictual situation in any region and can thus help to escape the security dilemma. Henceforth, the psychological interpretation of this in international relations is attributed to the fact that world politics operates in such a way that states operate in this spiral,

and misperception is common (Davis & McDermott, 2021).

Furthermore, on the question of interpreting signals from other states, scholars argue that the intention of the sender to prevent any sort of stress in terms of conflict is the main driver of shaping the dynamics of the signals towards the receiver. Prominent examples in this case can be highlighted in the form of the collaboration between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The deployment of missiles into Cuba allowed the Soviets to overcome their weakness in intercontinental ballistic missile technology and hence provided them with the opportunity to prove themselves stronger. Decision makers or statesmen have the internal desire to fulfil their complexes in the form of military power (Mercer, 2017).

The Illusion of Strength: Psychological Biases in Crisis Diplomacy and Conflict Escalation

However, while interpreting signals in the times of crisis, the contributions made by Kahneman and Renshon are particularly essential in terms of highlighting the "Hawkish Biases" in the international relations and can lead to states totally misunderstanding the signals given by the adversary state and can hence lead to very different conflictual results (Kahneman & Rehsnhon, 2009). Such that the tendency of the state to indulge in an illusion of positivity that overestimates the capacity of one's own self. There can be different ways in which these illusions take form and can lead to misinterpretation of signals from the adversaries, and can even distort the signals conveyed by the state itself.

The most prominent illusion that surpasses the expectations of any state is the military capacity of a state that can alter a number of factors that can contribute to not only misperception in the form of a false bargaining procedure, but can also lead to the worsening of conflict and a high threat of war. Furthermore, overestimation and overconfidence in the ability to bargain can also produce signals that are entirely irrelevant to the contemporary scenario of the conflict and can therefore lead to an even worse situation (Kahneman & Renshon, 2009).

Psychological Biases in Crisis Decision-Making: Overconfidence and Competition Neglect

Kahneman argues that the positive perception of a state's own image is a different field of interoperation in politics and can lead to a false sense of transparency within the state (Kahneman & Rehsnhon, 2009). Furthermore, states try to miscalculate their positive intentions towards enemies by misjudging the intensity of their positive intentions. This gives rise to the spiral again, and hence the security dilemma takes even worse form in this scenario. The inclination towards being overconfident in a highly volatile international environment can only

worsen the security dilemma and is attributed by scholars as 'competition neglect'. This refers to the inability of the state to judge the capacities of its competitors in terms of military or economic might. The overconfidence neglects the ability to comprehend and contemplate the abilities that the competitors hold in an international environment. Thereby, this would lead to gross misjudgment of the interpretation of signals by the state and the adversaries (Sagan, 1993).

Overconfidence and the Escalation of the Security Dilemma

While assessing the measure of overconfidence by states in terms of sending or receiving signals, the "illusion of control" also generates misinterpretation, which takes birth from the motivated reasoning of a state. The conception can be used to explain the illusion that engulfs the decision makers in a blanket of false control that they perceive in their own actions. This motivates the decision makers to get involved in higher risks under the premise that they enjoy full control over their actions, and they will be able to control any sort of risk that is generated by the actions. Such that the illusion of control leads towards a sense of false control and can lead to total miscalculation of the costs of war, and can cause a major downfall for the state (Casler & Yarhi Milo, 2023).

The analysis suggests that the persistence of these illusions continues to overshadow individuals and states throughout history. However, what sort of lessons can decision makers learn while attempting to signal resolution during a crisis? The analysis that revolves around analogical reasoning from history is particularly impressive. Jervis believes that individuals have the capacity to focus on what has occurred rather than on why the event took place in the first place. He attributes learning from history to be artificial, with a strict analysis on the point that the ideas that are extracted from past historical events are applied in situations that are entirely different in context and operation (Levy, 2023).

Signaling Resolution: The Rationalist Approach and Its Limitations

While the paper assesses all these political psychological models in order to assess the extent to which they can influence a foreign policy decision maker's ability to signal resolution in crises, it is necessary to understand that, conclusively, a rationalist behavioral bargaining model might provide us with an answer. Scholars such as Fearon posit that state being rational actors can inherently not go to war apart from being under the condition of misinformation, commitment, and irreducible problems. The foremost condition, which is the primary focus of this paper, refers to signaling to resolution during a crisis. The argument stems from the fact that all states, being rational actors, have the general knowledge related to the

detrimental aftermath of the war and can therefore reach a reasonable conclusion related to a settlement that can help avert the crisis and hence provide a better solution to the problem. However, if states have their own set of information that suggests that their material capacities during war are stronger than those of the enemy, then they might go to war as they can receive greater returns from the war. Signaling at this point becomes meaningless, and states cannot resolve despite bargaining (Fearon, [1995](#)).

Conclusion

Conclusively, the paper made use of various political psychological models to help us understand how these theories can help us explain the international relations of the state in their effort to avert a crisis and reach a resolution. The rationalist aspect in this regard proves to be more reasonable as it tends to align with prominent theoretical tiers in the study of political science. Political psychological aspects help us to understand the manifestation of human nature on an international level in the form of the actions taken by the states in the form of decision makers' personal human expertise.

References

- Casler, D., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2023). Signaling, resolve, and reputation in international politics. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (3rd ed., p. 426). Oxford University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Davis, J. W., & McDermott, R. (2021). The past, present, and future of behavioral IR. *International Organization*, 75(1), 147–177.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000482>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Elster, J. (1990). When rationality fails. In K. S. Cook & M. Levi (Eds.), *The Limits of Rationality* (pp. 19–51). University of Chicago Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization*, 49(3), 379–414.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). *Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment*. Free Press. <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1978-00284-000>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Jervis, R. (2017). *Perception and misperception in international politics* (New ed.). Princeton University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kahneman, D., & Renshon, J. (2009). Hawkish biases. In A. T. Thrall & J. K. Cramer (Eds.), *American foreign policy and the politics of fear: Threat inflation since 9/11* (pp. 79–86). Routledge.
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203879092-13/hawkish-biases-daniel-kahneman-jonathan-renshon>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kaufmann, C. (2004). Threat inflation and the failure of the marketplace of ideas: The selling of the Iraq war. *International Security*, 29(1), 5–48.
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203879092-14/threat-inflation-failure-marketplace-ideas-selling-iraq-war-chaim-kaufmann>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kertzer, J. D., & Tingley, D. (2018). Political psychology in international relations: Beyond the paradigms. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21, 319–339.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-015509>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Lebow, R. N. (1981). *Between war and peace: The nature of international crisis*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Levy, J. S. (1994). Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. *International Organization*, 48(2), 279–312.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028201>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Levy, J. S. (2023). Foreign policy decision-making: The psychological dimension. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). *Organizations*. Wiley.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Mercer, J. (2010). Emotional beliefs. *International Organization*, 64(1), 1–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990271>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Mercer, J. (2017). The illusion of international prestige. *International Security*, 41(4), 133–168.
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00275
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). *Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment*. Prentice-Hall.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Sagan, S. D. (1993). *The limits of safety: Organizations, accidents, and nuclear weapons*. Princeton University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
<https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Yarhi-Milo, K. (2018). *Who fights for reputation: The psychology of leaders in international conflict* (Vol. 156). Princeton University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)