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An Analysis of Confidence-Building Measures in India-Pakistan Relations: Pre-1999 Perspectives

Abstract

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Keywords: Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), India, Pakistan, Simla Agreement

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An Analysis of Confidence-Building Measures in India-Pakistan Relations: Pre-1999 Perspectives

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to discuss historical context of confidence building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan before 1999. This article delves into the development of CBMs from the post-partition era until the Kargil conflict in 1999, examining the significant initiatives, obstacles, and circumstances that influenced the process of building trust between India and Pakistan. Following the division, the two nations were involved in several conflicts, which greatly impacted their trust and cooperation. However, instances of diplomatic progress resulted in notable milestones, including the Tashkent agreement, the Simla agreement, and the Lahore declaration (1999). These initiatives primarily concentrated on enhancing military transparency, establishing communication channels (such as the hotline between military commanders), and fostering personal connections between individuals. Despite facing challenges such as political instability, terrorism, and mistrust, the pre-1999 CBMs provided a foundation for future discussions and stability.

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Introduction

India – Pakistan relations can be defined as a complex web of conflict and mistrust, regardless of whether peace has been achieved intermittently. For almost seven decades after the partition of British India in 1947, the two nations continued to be engaged and at odds in a

cascade of hostility and contention, due to territorial disputes; military showdowns; and the deep rifts of political and ideological differences. In general, the Kashmir issue has been an irritant per se, and it has been responsible for many wars, shaping their larger strategic perceptions. Nonetheless, there have been some attempts for periods of peacebuilding, for example in the form of



confidence-building measures (CBMs). Although these efforts, while limited in scope and reach, tend never to achieve very much, they are the gussied up, and still spurious, vestiges of lasting yet still brittle hope for some form of diplomatic contact between these two antagonistic states.

This chapter analyses the historical background of CBMs between India and Pakistan prior to 1999, wherein the conflict pattern, dialogue, and efforts of peace that have marked their bilateral relationship are explored. The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), the Tashkent Agreement (1966), and the Simla Agreement (1972) are examined as key milestones, how far they have been achieved, and how lacking. The chapter also analyzes the consequences of the nuclearization of the two countries by focusing on how the development of nuclear capability increased the security dilemma as well as the urgency for structured diplomatic engagements. In addition, they analyze the events surrounding the Kargil conflict (1999) as a turning point both to indicate past CBMs are fragile and to indicate the urgency of establishing a more durable conflict resolution framework.

This chapter represents an attempt to explain these factors that influenced Indo-Pakistani diplomacy before 1999 by examining these historical developments. It focuses on exactly those challenges that impeded long-term peace efforts, and the lessons learned that enabled the CBMs of the Musharraf era. It is important to understand this historical context to answer why CBMs have never been successful and the factors hampering India–Pakistan relations in the post-1999 period.

Early Years (1947-1960s)

Immediately after partition in 1947, both India and Pakistan were met with deep uncertainty, hostility, and conditions in which to survive. The respective nations had to engage in nation-building on top of unresolved territorial disputes, mass displacement, and communal violence. The conflicts between the two quickly turned into a most visible and contentious issue which was highlighted by the first of many wars. They would set the stage for cycles of hostility that involved occasional periods of diplomatic deal-making followed by immediate tension. Nevertheless, while there was pervasive animosity, there were also occasions when strong interests and practical bargaining could result in shared interests and breakthroughs in diplomacy seen in the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) and the Tashkent Declaration (1966). However, these agreements were so much the exceptions rather than a trend: the prevailing story of enmity and mutual suspicion continued to dominate the broader Indo-Pakistani relationship (Schofield, 2010).

The history of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan since 1947,

congealed in a cyclical clash of diplomatic engagements, lost opportunities, and frail peace efforts that are founded on a gap rooted in past animosity with mutual distrust. Over the decades, a number of CBMs have been introduced to diminish tensions, foster dialogue, and reduce the risk of military escalation; however, the totality of the effectiveness of such CBMs has been hindered by political instability, security dilemmas, and entrenched narratives of hostility. The two authors conclude that CBMs between India and Pakistan have remained reactive so far instead of being part of a long-standing peace-building strategy, as written by Effendi and Ahmad (2020).

Because the institutionalization of CBMs has been constrained by this crisis-driven approach, CBMs are easily set back when conflicts or shifts in governments occur. Additionally, the study indicates that most of the efforts made in CBMs have been at a surface level, consisting of diplomatic summits and cultural exchanges, but none of which addresses the root causes of hostility, specifically, the Kashmir dispute and cross-border militancy. These measures have also fallen mainly on deaf ears owing to a lack of trust-building mechanisms at both state and societal levels, the meanings of which are often counteracted by nationalist rhetoric and public perception. Finally, Effendi and Ahmad (2020) further claim that while the United States and the United Nations have utilized their power as international actors to encourage CBMs, their actions have been selective and motivated by geostrategic considerations which has not translated into a persistent willingness to pursue peace. The inconsistency in the CBM implementation is attributable to this selective intervention that is responsible for periods of high diplomatic activity to be followed by renewed hostilities. The historical path of India-Pakistan CBMs finally ends up with the need for a more structured, long term and mutually beneficial engagement pattern involving more than the ad hoc short-term crisis management however, and efficient in progressing towards conflict resolutions marked with sustained political and societal trust building.

The confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have shown a record of short-lived successes and long perennial failures, both because of institutionalization problems, abiding mistrust, and recurrent crises of security. The functionality of CBMs is that they have oftentimes provided a short-term de-escalation and diplomatic engagement but not developed into an ongoing peaceful resolution mechanism because they have not been taken as a part of a carefully established peace conflict resolution strategy, as Sheik (2023) points out. A major weakness of CBMs as pointed out by the study is that they are frequently damage control measures taken after major conflicts or crises rather than proactive peace measures. Due to this pattern

of diplomacy driven by crises, we have established an unstable and fragile framework by which CBMs can be overrun by incidents of cross-border tensions, terrorist attacks, or political changes.

Sheikh (2023) also notes that India and Pakistan have during times regularly applied CBMs using strategic thinking to shape international perspectives but not to address core disputes such as to resolve militarily tense Kashmir or disputes between the contentions amongst Line of Control (LoC). The study further draws attention to the fact that irrespective of CBMs, underlying political grievances will remain unsolved and these will remain mere temporary tools, not a credible step towards reconciliation. Also nonexistent is the sort of consistent political will and domestic consensus about peace initiatives that things like CBMs can produce only for a short time. According to Sheikh (2023), CBMs have to be institutionalized into formal agreements, strengthened through public engagement, and shielded from political responses, in order to be effective.

The Kashmir Conflict

The conflict in Kashmir has been at the center of Indo-Pakistani tension since it was divided. The main issue of the first Indo-Pakistani war (1947-48) was the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a Hindu Maharaja ruled, though the majority of the population was Muslim. Military confrontations took place between India and Pakistan as they both claimed it and finally, a United Nations-mediated ceasefire brought the creation of the Line of Control (LoC). But it did not solve the dispute; rather, the division of Kashmir institutionalized the conflict so that Kashmir came to epitomize the unresolved grievances and nationalistic fervor of the two nations. Disagreements over demilitarization and governance led disagreements to continue over the United Nations' proposal of a plebiscite (Kashmiris could decide their own future). Because it was not just a territorial dispute, but an ideological and security issue, military strategies evolved to include the use of Kashmir in the 1965 and 1971 wars (Ganguly, 2018).

Although Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have helped to mitigate the risk of nearby hostilities, there is little confidence that their long-term effect will have a positive result as long-term security crises, political instability, and deep-rooted mistrust continue to dominate political affairs between the two states. This article (Shamshad and Khan, 2022) submits that while CBMs have resulted in temporary de-escalation, they fail to represent a permanent peace process as they do not take into account the structural suitors of conflict, such as the dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. A major deficit of CBMs is the fact that these have mainly been state-centric, concentrating on diplomatic and military contact while

leaving out non-state-based measures to build trust at the societal level. As a result, we have had a fragile peace, easily brought to an end by nationalist rhetoric, political change, or terrorist incidents.

The lack of a mechanism to bind progress in continuance of CBM leads to the fact that it is short-lived, as was evident after the Kargil conflict (1999), the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and the 2008 Mumbai attack, where moments of CBM wore out soon. Shamshad and Khan (2022) state that for CBMs to be truly successful they need to go beyond mere symbolic gestures and be dealt with through formal legal frameworks which would protect the CBMs from changes in political leadership or security concerns which would otherwise derail present peace efforts. Furthermore, the study calls for more people-to-people engagement, media cooperation, and educational exchanges in order to create a culture of trust rather than hostility. The current CBM model, however, is deficient in devising a shorter and longer-term solution to the complex Indo-Pakistani relations. While CBMs have been identified as one of the most fruitful avenues for engagement, Shamshad and Khan (2022) argue that the latter should instead put emphasis on enduring mechanisms to build trust in place of temporary conflict management tools, in order to facilitate a peaceful and cooperative South Asia.

The Indus Waters Treaty

Despite intense tension, then there were intervals of practical cooperation that demonstrated the possibility of diplomacy within an adversarial association. Still, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) remains a landmark post because it set up a framework for such cooperation between the two nations, placing responsibility for the Indus River and its tributaries under India and Pakistan's control, respectively. By using resources and techniques to broker the treaty, the World Bank brokering prevented what would have been a major environmental and geopolitical disaster, proving that technical and resource-based disputes could be settled through negotiations. Although wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999 destroyed the agreement on multiple occasions, this was a demonstration of the fact that bilateral agreements with strong institutional support could weather political volatility. Diplomatic interaction, trade discussion, and a certain appreciation for other peoples' cultures were sporadic and were sometimes overwhelmed by the attitude of militarization and nationalism. First, the treaty though successful failed to prove to be a precursor to more widespread reconciliation, as its scope was confined to early CBMs (Michel, 2017).

The 1965 War and the Tashkent Declaration

Kashmir came to the center of the First Indo-Pakistani

war further strengthening distrust and hostility between the two countries. Under the political pressure of international efforts, the Tashkent Declaration (1966), a mediator of the Soviet Union, had been reached after weeks of intense military engagement. Troop withdrawals were agreed upon and reaffirmed commitments to peaceful resolution of disputes, giving hopes of a period of optimism. While it did manage to de-escalate the immediate tensions between the two sides, it did not find a satisfactory solution to find the root causes of the conflict as neither side was willing to make substantial concessions on Kashmir. The agreement was met with resistance in Pakistan, some of the political factions and parts of the armed forces saw it as a diplomatic defeat. Eventually, the dissatisfaction resulted in pulling apart peace efforts and resulted in the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. However, as always, nationalist sentiment and military concerns zipped through diplomatic engagements and continued peace efforts were fragile in the Tashkent Declaration even though its significance was noted by many (Khan, 2021).

Early CBMs as Fragile Attempts at Peace

The period of Indo-Pakistani relations from 1947 to the 1960s was characterized by conflict, military clash, and political turbulence; however, it harbored a few cases of cooperation, many of which indicate the possibility of diplomacy. Specific circumstances in which limited CBMs could succeed include those supported by such international mediation, especially in the Indus Waters Treaty and the Tashkent Declaration. But it was these things more than anything else that defined the relationship, overshadowing these efforts. As such, each new attempt at reconciliation had to be launched from the same scratch due to the treatment of CBMs in the absence of institutionalizing it into a broader peace framework. The episodic engagement and breakdowns of these types respectively set the circumstances for future peace efforts; including the CBMs of the Musharraf era which like these too were constrained both structurally and politically (Dasgupta, 2000). The understanding of the limits and shortcomings of early CBMs is essential for the problem of why Indo-Pakistani peace efforts have largely been flimsy and tough to keep.

A review of CBMs in Indo-Pakistani history indicates that the failures of working through non-military, such as diplomatic and cultural, engagements are indicative of the fact that unresolved political and security conflicts end up engendering deep conflicts. According to Syed (2020), non-military CBMs like trade deals, cultural exchanges, and people-to-people diplomacy have been pursued at times but they have mostly failed to achieve long-term stability on account of inherent mistrust, volatility of politics, and nationalistic narratives on both sides. CBMs, as we have seen in the case of non-military CBMs, are

susceptible to security tensions and antagonistic media narratives; even the smallest volatile political or border matters can wipe clean any efforts at peace. Furthermore, non-military CBMs have at the same time been promoted as symbolic measures and not substantive measures and declined institutionalization that might protect them from political setbacks.

This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that how trade agreements and cross-border bus services have been suspended a couple of times because of security concerns, so economic and cultural cooperation won't be possible in a setting where militarized tensions predominate the socio-economic policy decision. In addition, Syed (2020) demonstrates that societal perceptions also have an important role in the failure of non-military CBMs such as deeply ingrained distrust and centuries of conflicted narratives that preclude cross-border initiatives from achieving broad public support. Also, non-military CBMs proceed slowly without parallel progress on core political disputes. However, the study insists that for non-military CBMs to work, they need to be institutionalized and go along with structured political dialogue in order to avoid economic, cultural, and educational exchanges being held to security concerns. In his conclusion, Syed (2020) argues that the Indo-Pakistani peace efforts should be witnessed through the integration of non-military CBMs into a larger framework of trust building with consistent engagement, conflict resolution mechanisms, and public diplomacy that consolidates for enduring stability.

Cycles of Conflict and Dialogue (1970s–1980s)

Conflict and engagement continued in the 1970s and 1980s being more in line with what had become the India-Pakistan relationship. The 1971 war shook the geopolitics of South Asia and created Bangladesh, a new state that rested right in the middle of the plate itself, which offered an opportunity for a glimpse of a clean break between the two existing states. But that hope of better relations was brief; instead, political distrust, lingering disputes, and a rising militarization on the part of both countries took hold once more. After the war, in the aftermath, there was an attempt to introduce a new framework for dialogue based on bilateralism and diplomatic negotiation, which resulted in the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972. However, political tensions and mutual suspicion continued to make Indo-Pakistani relations hostage. Both CBMs and financial aid were rendered harder to achieve by the development of nuclear capabilities in both countries, however, at the same time, the security landscape became even more complicated from this fact. At this time sporadic attempts were made to engage in confidence building, but these efforts received little political support and were constantly stymied by renewed wars (Mansingh, 2006).

The 1971 War and the Simla Agreement

The political crisis in East Pakistan (modern Bangladesh) in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war triggered by the Indo Pak Pakistani war of 1971 was a decisive military defeat Pakistan left with a lopsided power equation in the region. As a response to this war, both countries tried to change their diplomatic engagement through the Simla Agreement of 1972 signed by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It required the two nations to handle the dispute in a bilateral way and avoid any third-party mediation while at the same time paving the way for the gradual normalization of ties. Simla was hailed as a step forward but essentially made no positive advancement since neither side presented the kind of flexibility on the important issues most particularly, Kashmir --. After some time, political disagreements on the correct interpretation of this agreement, coupled with the absence of a proper implementation mechanism, made it almost useless. However, the limitations of that agreement did, however, reflect a certain accord, that even in the wake of such intense conflict, such diplomatic structures remained as potential (Sethi, 2012).

Nuclearization and Security Dilemma

This was complicated further by the growing nuclear ambitions of both India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. After this, India's first nuclear test in 1974 as well as the attempts made by Pakistan to develop nuclear ability, added to the security dilemma and led to a situation of mutual deterrence as well as increased risks of miscalculation. The region has become nuclearized, any future conflict could, therefore, have the potential for catastrophic escalation as well as justifying risk reduction measures and Diplomatic communication. Nevertheless, CBM's execution was in obvious need in this nuclear context yet progress was slow due to ongoing distrust and security fears on both sides. Although nuclear deterrence may have prevented war at a full scale, it elevated political hostility and attenuated the incentive for actually building peace. This entire period has been marked by largely reactive, not proactive, diplomacy, meaning that CBMs frequently took the form of reaction to crises being used as an armistice rather than implementing it as part of strategic long-term conflict management (Bidwai, Vanpraag, 2000).

There has been a lack of trust building and the absence of institutional mechanisms for sustained dialogues in nuclear South Asia to render CBMs ineffective. He underscores that hence the contribution of CBMs between India and Pakistan to preventing war has proved effective, but these CBMs have not resulted in long-term stability as the dominant factor in either policy-making or security has retained the lethality of nuclear deterrence (2020). Although nuclear weapons have

contributed to the stabilization and instability of Indo-Pakistani relations, they have paradoxically discouraged major conflicts and enhanced the possibility of miscalculation and crisis escalation. Even in a nuclearized environment, the Kargil conflict (1999), the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks showed that conflicts can become dangerously escalated even if CBMs and monitors were in place.

While Indo-Pakistani CBMs have been constrained to deescalate on the military front, such as arrangements for the hotlines between military commanders and agreements to give missile notification, Javaid (2020) has emphasized that most of the CBMs so far have not addressed the underlying political differences that are driving tensions. However, there is also no crisis resolution mechanism, such that whenever tensions go up, CBMs are abandoned or suspended, i.e., their reactive character, and not a proactive peacebuilding strategy.

The significant challenge is besides the role of domestic politics and their nationalist sentiments that often dictate the direction of foreign policy and subsequently shape the sustainability of CBM engagement. To be effective peace mechanisms, CBMs must be institutionalized through legal agreements, the diplomatic dialogue supported by their structure executed, and extended to non-military fields, including trade, sports collaboration, cultural exchange, and media work among others, according to Javaid (2020). A broader treatment will be necessary in order for Indo-Pakistani relations to move beyond a cycle of temporary engagement with repeated tensions that would prevent the realization of permanent peace in South Asia.

CBMs: Scope, Limitations, and Impact

Although CBMs were made during the 1970s and 1980s, they were aimed at specific areas, namely in cultural exchanges, science collaboration, and on a very limited level of diplomatic engagement despite the high levels of distrust. Often, Track II-backed diplomacy sparked these CBMs, where experts and retired officials and not diplomats closed the backchannel. Some formal agreements between the two countries were also signed on trade, sports diplomacy, and people-to-people contact with the goal of easing hostility by other means than political. However, while the CBMs rained down, these big issues of core political conflicts such as Kashmir were never addressed or addressed in any meaningful way. Because there were no institutional mechanisms, these initiatives were subject to collapse as soon as another security crisis arose. Moreover, this limited the long-term impact of these CBMs because of the cyclical nature of Indo-Pakistani relations in which progress has been eroded by renewed tension. None of these measures brought about a fundamental change in the relations, but they maintained the channels of diplomacy and laid a

basis for future confidence-building measures (Kerr, 2001).

For over a quarter of a century, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have remained very fragile and inconsistent with a tendency to not meet their ostensible objectives due to unholy wrangles, unsettled territorial squabbles, and gullible changes in political patterns. CBMs are about reducing tensions, engaging diplomatically, and preventing the escalation of conflict; but, their implementation in the India-Pakistan context has been too ad hoc and reactive and has not been taken as part of a sustained peace process. Singh (2021) remarks that the fundamental weakness of Indo-Pakistani CBMs lies in the fact that they cannot address their core political and security concerns in particular the Kashmir issue and cross-border terrorism. Although most CBMs have been symbolic gestures, such as high-level diplomatic meetings, trade initiatives, cultural exchanges, and so forth, they do not have mechanisms for achieving long-term trust-building and conflict resolution. Nor have the security establishments on both sides tended to view CBMs with great confidence, which Singh (2021) supposes is because they have seen engagement on each side as potentially being used to the strategic or military advantage.

Nevertheless, political volatility, security concerns, and historical animosities have inhibited the roles of Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) in Indo-Pakistani relations. CBMs, according to Khalil (2014), have been important instruments in de-escalating tensions and collectively preventing direct military confrontations, but all these efforts have been so far limited by a lack of a long-term commitment to conflict resolution. Although there have been different CBMs, such as ceasefire agreements, diplomatic dialogue, and trade initiatives that were implemented, they all have been troubled by sudden changes in political leadership, nationalist rhetoric, and frequent security crises. According to Khalil (2014), the limitations of CBMs between India and Pakistan are their inadequate short-termism, which renders them more often than not employed as reactive crisis management devices than proactive peace-building strategies.

The lack of strategic vision has also rendered CBMs subject to politics of opportunity, sanitized war, and military confrontation so the CBMs never evolved into institutional mechanisms of trust building. Furthermore, as Khalil (2014) notes, distrust between the two states runs very deep, not only on a state level but endemic in the public consciousness, where historic grievances propel through to bolster the nationalistic narrative. Furthermore, CBMs are weakened by the lack of such societal-level engagement, i.e. absence of cross-border exchanges with people to people, and media cooperation. In addition, while the United States, and other external factors, such as international organizations, have called

for CBM, they have been mostly dependent on geopolitical interests rather than sincere commitment to Indo-Pakistani peace. Khalil (2014) concludes that in order for CBMs to be effective in transforming the India-Pakistan relationship, such CBMs need to be institutionalized, and depoliticized and result in a win for public engagement.

As a result of this security-centered approach, CBMs are reversed easily as tensions escalate, and that is what happened after the Kargil conflict (1999), the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In particular, CBMs are further undermined in terms of sustainable development due to the politicization of CBMs in domestic politics in which peace initiatives are usually packaged in terms of appeasement or concessions. For success, CBMs, Singh (2021) argues, must be institutionalized and not personality-driven so that as with changes in political leadership, continuity of dialogue is achieved. It calls for tougher verification regimes; strong diplomatic participation at the many levels that are involved; and an attempt to convert public narratives from being antagonistic to conciliatory. Without these structural changes, the CBMs will remain fragile, temporary, and likely to break down whenever it is that conditions of renewed conflict or political tension arise.

CBMs in a High-Tension Environment

Between the 1970s and the 1980s, conflicting developments that were plagued by peace and dialogue occurred, countered by each attempt at peace with new security problems. A framework in the Simla Agreement, but its implementation was a sign that it was not easy to keep diplomatic commitment in a hostile political atmosphere. Nuclear weapons advent complicated the Indo-Pakistani relationship further making crisis management and opening up for diplomatic engagement more urgent and at the same time increasing the stakes of the conflict. In this period, the CBMs tried were overwhelmingly traditional — they did not go to the core factors that created hostility between the two countries. Although these efforts were in fact little more than an expansion of the existing dialogue networks, this was succeeded nevertheless by the demonstration that otherwise periods of high rivalry should not exclude dialogue. These lessons would bear fruit with CBMs of the 1990s and the Musharraf era to create more structured, long-term confidence-building mechanisms.

It has been underscored countless times that international pressure and various powers and multilateral organizations that disseminated the message of peace, stability, and tranquility in the region had a key role to play during the Musharraf regime in the continuation of Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan. Bashir and Alvi (2022) further find that external diplomatic influence was central to the maintenance of

CBMs, as they were exposed to international scrutiny arising from both India and Pakistan with diplomatic bullets being increasingly fired at them subsequent to around 9/11 in the post-9/11 global security environment. Contributed to by the U.S.-led war on terror, concerns about cross-border terrorism, nuclear security, and regional stability increased both US and Indian desire to negotiate with opponents in crisis which was the result of official diplomacy and diplomatic efforts. Given the pressure from the West, above all, the United States, and its Musharraf regime had to pull out a willingness to engage in conversation, including via CBMs such as backchannel diplomacy, ceasefire, and trade agreements.

But while international involvement pushed the diplomatic table to a brightly lit meeting, it did not address the underlying problems of mistrust and strategic conflict between the two states. According to Bashir and Alvi (2022), many CBMs pursued in this period were not backed by a sincere desire to resolve the conflict, but more by external expectations, and such CBMs were therefore dependent on changing geopolitical interests. In addition, these CBMs are inherently fragile in the absence of strong domestic political consensus, they have ended on the basis of terrorist incidents, domestic political instability, or shifts in the leadership. For example, the study also stresses that CBMs do not rely on external mediation, since it is demonstrated by history that external pressure may lead to temporary engagement, but it can never result in the long term unless there are trust-building mechanisms innate within two countries. Thus, despite their perpetually fulfilling moments of success, the CBMs that took place during the Musharraf era were not conducive to a stable Indo-Pakistani framework because the CBMs during the Musharraf era were more reactive to urgent demands rather than proactive efforts to resolve conflict.

The Road to 1999

In terms of geopolitics and the impact of foreign diplomacy on the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, the period between 1999 and 1999 was highly volatile and prone to certain unexpected changes that may cultivate a lasting odium between the two countries. On the one hand, there were quite frequent attempts at the building of peace through CBMs, yet they were often overpowered by growing tensions, unresolved territorial claims, and profound suspicion. 1999, the Kargil conflict was a watershed moment on the limits of previous CBMs and fragile Indo-Pakistani diplomacy. At the same time, the Cold War came to an end, U.S. influence in South Asia strengthened, and terrorism became a worldwide security problem for both nations. Lessons from this period were also key to the Musharraf-era CBMs in

ending the structural deficiency of previous peace efforts (Tellis, 2016).

Escalating Tensions and the Shadow of Kargil

Over the 1990s, tensions between India and Pakistan remained dangerously high even as there were various attempts at diplomatic engagement and confidence building. Progress has also been lost through CBMs and cross-border militancy in Kashmir, which rose in tandem with each other, alongside mutual accusations of state-sponsored terrorism. In the conflict culminating in the 1999 Kargil conflict in Kargil, Jammu, and Kashmir, a short but intense military confrontation took place in the mountainous region. The two nuclear-armed nations came so close to complete war that this can be overturned so quickly by security crises. India repelled the incursion but this event reinforced perceptions of betrayal and increased mistrust, especially in India where the timely Lahore Declaration of just months earlier was, to many Indians, a deceitful trick by Pakistan. During subsequent peace efforts, the Kargil shadow loomed over reaffirming diplomatic commitments to the detriment of CBMs that required sacrifice of military and strategic interests (Tellis, 2016).

The Evolving Geopolitical Context

Indo-Pakistan relations changed during the post-Cold War era under the new geopolitical realities. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States the status of a global superpower and Washington's role in South Asian affairs grew. Indo-Pakistani diplomacy got caught up in the U.S. effort to turn the politics of nuclear restraint and regional stability against conflict escalation into full-scale wars. Also, with the world turning its minds towards terrorism, especially with the end of the Afghan-Soviet war, South Asia was taken as a critical region for security international. The international community persuaded peace initiatives while at the same time failing to find a solution to the key disputes, as India and Pakistan refused to allow external mediation in cases such as Kashmir. Finally, both countries' nuclearization in 1998 resonated with a new layer of strategic complexity in that, by that time, both countries had to factor in the threat of nuclear escalation into the military and diplomatic calculations. The structured CBMs were needed in a changing geopolitical landscape as the highly competitive global security priorities were making it more complicated to implement (Kerr, 2001).

The post-Cold War period has seen substantial dependence of the normalization process between India and Pakistan on Confidence-building Measures (CBMs), primarily. Ahmar (1993) contends that CBMs have been important in controlling inter-state hostilities between the two nuclear-armed states, but have been severely limited

in their effectiveness on account of deeply embedded security dilemmas, political rigidity, and historic grievances. The study points out that the introduction of CBMs was to reduce the probability of military escalation, but CBMs failed in their transition to become long-term institutionalized peace frameworks. Indo-Pak CBMs have been one of the key limitations as they have not been able to address structural sources of conflict, especially, the Kashmir dispute and cross-border hostilities.

Ahmar (1993) additionally states that after the end of the Cold War, there was greater global pressure on both countries to use diplomacy rather than war so a number of peace initiatives and talks were initiated. But these CBMs tended to be short on life, quick to bounce when attacked by terrorists, border clashes, or leadership changes. The study also points out that CBMs between India and Pakistan have on frequent occasions been without adequate transparency and verification arrangements, engendering reciprocal suspicions as to the genuineness of each party's statement of intent. According to Ahmar (1993), however, CBMs to be successful and durable must be institutionalized through legally binding agreements, have adequate monitoring systems in place, as well as domestic political consensus. Without these structural reinforcements, CBMs will be used as short-term conflict management instruments, rather than as real peace-making tools. To this end, while the post-Cold War era gave rise to new possibilities for engagement, the history of distrust and security-focused policy-making in Indo Paki relations kept CBMs of the Indo Paki relations from making their sustainable impact in the long run.

The Musharraf Era

During the pre-1999 period, there were several sets of setbacks and renewed attempts at dialogue, of which Kargil was a reminder of interminable obstacles but also an incentive for new peace efforts. The most important step in nuclear risk reduction and state-to-state diplomatic engagement was the Lahore Declaration of 1999 but the Kargil conflict brought about a complete nullification of its progress. During this period, the repeated failures of CBMs revealed that constant political will, reciprocal trust-building measures, and a framework that could endure security crises were absolutely needed. Despite their limited success, the past CBMs: (1) contained valuable lessons on the need for diplomatic engagement to be continual and not crisis-driven; (2) could only succeed if they dealt with the core disputes and not just the surface ones; and (3) military and intelligence establishments should be involved in the peace processes, to disarm security-oriented policies. It would contribute these lessons toward the Musharraf era CBMs, which aimed to understand past mistakes and address the more deep-rooted structural barriers to peace (Mansingh, 2006).

The Road to 1999 and the Foundations for Future CBMs

The 1999 period was crucial for the evolution of CBMs between India and Pakistan. Major conflicts such as Kargil served to further strengthen the distrust but it also left the need for more structured mechanisms for preventing conflicts more urgent. CBMs in South Asia thus became more necessary and more complex, but also possible during the geopolitical shifts that occurred in the post-Cold War era, especially after the nuclearization and increased concern over terrorism. This helped me understand the structural flaws in the very structure of Indo-Pak diplomacy that needed a stronger and long-term confidence-building approach. The involvement of these lessons in CBMs during the Musharraf era, in its Musharraf version also required structured negotiations, military contacts, and back-channel communication. To do so would be useful in elaborating why CBMs have not achieved lasting peace in the current period, and also to better understand the postures of Indo-Pakistani relations within contemporary beings.

Conclusion

Confidence-building measures tools between India and Pakistan have repeatedly failed to deliver, pointing to the need for a radically new approach, which goes far beyond traditional diplomatic and military engagement, in creating cooperation through the institutionalization of the mechanisms operating for the long term. French (2019) points out that past CBMs have been largely reactive and that such reactive CBMs have been highly fragile and easily reversible. Indo-Pakistani CBMs have been a core weakness of all such CBMs because they have no structural reinforcement, that is, they are not capable of withstanding changes in political leadership, military tensions, or nationalist pressure.

French (2019) highlights that confidence-building efforts should be more wide-ranged to involve other stakeholders than just state actors, including civil society, business communities, and educational institutions. It can also make more strategic broader engagement and help divert attention away from bargaining of short-term peace gestures towards substantive initiatives of long-term regional cooperation and economization of the region horizontally, including economic interdependence, cultural dialogue, and policy continuity. Because of this, devote much time and energy to media narratives and public perception, which have time and again played a destructive role in Indo-Pakistani relations, rather than one of fostering reconciliation.

French (2019) argues that a successful CBM strategy must also include something that counters misinformation and creates media platforms for positive discourse. Moreover, military establishments in both

countries continue to be important power centers and it is unlikely that CBMs can succeed without their active buy-in. Finally, the study concludes that past Indo-Pakistani CBMs have been unsuccessful for the reasons they were either symbolic or security-focused and neglected the more social and economic components of peacebuilding. For real cooperation, the CBMs must undergo institutionalized arrangements out of which strategic cycles and dilemmas have no place, providing a secure and durable base for long-lasting peace.

Before 1999, the India-Pakistan relationship had a historical trajectory of persistent conflict and intermittent interaction in which violence and diplomatic relations have alternately coexisted. Partition trauma, the Kashmir dispute not addressed, and the dint of wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999) had imbued a thick soil for mistrust that decided the pattern of bilateral interaction. As military confrontation progressed through each stage, each put together more adversarial perceptions, making for the steady entrenchment of adversarial perceptions that were so resistant to dips of a diplomatic nature. Moments of dialogue emerged, despite such a hostile one, as cooperation was not entirely impossible. For instance, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) served as a remarkable example of successful conflict management since shared challenges were negotiated through structured negotiations. The Tashkent (1966) and Simla (1972) Agreements, despite being only vaguely implemented, indicated that dialogue could not be dispensed with even after great conflicts (Mansingh, 2006).

But there would be no lasting peace, as part of the engagement was followed by renewed tensions. CBMs were inherently fragile since the bilateral relation between Indo-Pak was cyclical: diplomatically there was progress interrupted by security crises and political instability, war, and cross-border hostilities. In 1998 both nations further nuclearized their security dilemma, raising the stakes of future conflicts and making it even more imperative to have such crisis prevention mechanisms. During this period the initiation of numerous CBMs was assured, but most of them did not focus on the causes of conflict and

continued as a short-term solution only. However, these early efforts were, for the most part, barren with respect to the attainment of sustained stability, nevertheless, they did convey to future diplomatic initiatives lessons that sustained engagement, reciprocal trust building, and addressing core disputes, rather than short-term surface agreement, are invaluable (Kerr, 2001).

The 1999 Kargil conflict was both a warning and a catalyst for both Pakistan and India. On the one hand, it reaffirmed the downside of deliberately unresolved tensions and its implications for the continued vulnerability of peace efforts in the absence of a strong institute of empowered CBM elements. However, it helped the international community to become more actively engaged, pressing both India and Pakistan to talk but to de-escalate. Also contributing to this new approach to CBMs is the ability of the post-Cold War world to shift to regional stability and counterterrorism efforts. Thus, during the post-1999 period, particularly during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, no matter how weak and disparate this emphasis on structured CBMs appeared, the earlier successes and failures were taken as guide spiked.

In some ways, this pre-1999 setting set the foundation for future CBM initiatives wherein both countries adapted to resolving conflict in the years following. A new set of circumstances in which new approaches to CBMs became necessary and inevitable were brought by the legacy of wars and peace attempts, the eroding and evolving nature of threats (terrorism and nuclear escalation), and the rise of actors beyond the region. At the same time, the Musharraf era did not develop in isolation, since the outcomes of previous conflicts and diplomatic embarrassments were to influence the scope, objectives, and strategies of the CBMs during the first decade of the 2000s. While assessing the effectiveness of CBMs during the Musharraf period we understand the possibilities and obstacles associated with Indo-Pakistani peace efforts out of this historical background.

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